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Police self-deployment, described generally as the unauthorized mass response of 
officers to critical incidents, is alternately condemned or hailed as heroism. Confined to 
response narratives in after-action reports, existing literature provides no comprehensive 
definition. Without clear principles, it is challenging to prevent the problems produced by 
self-deployment such as traffic congestion and diminished command and control; 
nevertheless, encouraging the ingenuity and initiative leading to heroic and lifesaving acts 
is equally difficult. Many of the descriptions of police self-deployment match 
characteristics of wicked problems, as proposed by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber. Using 
a case study analysis of police responses to the 2013 Christopher Dorner manhunt and 2013 
Boston Marathon bombings, this thesis explored police self-deployment through the lens 
of wicked problems. A better understanding of the definition resulted in policy and training 
recommendations, including the suggestions that law enforcement embrace, rather than 
prohibit, self-deployment and that federally mandated incident command policies 
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Police self-deployment refers generally to the unauthorized response of officers to 
critical incidents. However, existing literature provides no comprehensive definition and is 
confined to descriptive narratives in after-action reports. If the results of police self-
deployment to an incident are undesirable or harmful, self-deployment is condemned. 
Conversely, if police respond to an event without authorization yet perform—if only in 
hindsight—daring and creative acts, these officers are cited as heroes and their response is 
judged a success. Without clear principles, preventing symptoms of self-deployment such 
as traffic congestion and diminished command and control is challenging; nevertheless, 
encouraging the ingenuity and initiative leading to heroic and lifesaving acts is equally 
difficult.  
Police self-deployment is most problematic at critical or “black swan” events, 
especially in the chaotic first stages. Cynthia Renaud uses the term “edge of chaos” to 
describe this tumultuous period, equating it to a biological process whereby a cell may be 
created or destroyed.1 Arguing that the edge of chaos is resistant to the forms and structure 
of the National Incident Management Systems (NIMS) and the Incident Command System 
(ICS) specifically, Renaud suggests that improvisation and creativity—hallmarks of self-
initiated policing—are the best tools for responders during this period.  
A basic understanding of federal protocol clarifies the role of police self-
deployment in incident response. Since 9/11, command and control of resources at critical 
incidents means applying the NIMS, of which ICS is one tool.2 ICS is a management 
structure designed to provide flexible, efficient, and effective command in critical 
incidents.3 Developed by the fire service to fight wildfires, ICS prohibits self-deployment 
                                                 
1 Cynthia E. Renaud, “Making Sense in the Edge of Chaos: A Framework for Effective Initial 
Response Efforts to Large-Scale Incidents” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 11. 
2 Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: GPO, 
2008), 1. 
3 FEMA, “Working Draft: National Incident Management System Refresh,” Center for Threat 




due to the dangers observed when firefighters freelance or respond individually. Fire 
departments nationwide have also adopted ICS in day-to-day operations. Law enforcement, 
unlike firefighting, has less use for ICS in daily operations. In fact, practitioners, policy 
makers, and researchers accept that ICS in policing has been less effective.4 Nonetheless, 
in 2004, the Department of Homeland Security, through a series of presidential directives, 
mandated that ICS be used as the official template for incident response, and directly 
connected federal funding to its use by partner agencies.5  
Many critical events, as well as most routine problems to which law enforcement 
responds, fall under the definition of wicked problems. First identified by Horst Rittel and 
Melvin Webber as unique to the realm of public policy, wicked problems span such 
intractable topics as poverty, terrorism, and the environment, and cannot be solved by 
traditional scientific methods. Rittel and Webber have identified ten characteristics of 
wicked problems—they are not a series of tests to mechanically determine “wickedness,” 
but rather insights to judge whether a problem is wicked.6 Mark Wexler expanded on the 
morality of these wicked characteristics, specifically in a public planning context. This 
thesis proposed that viewing police self-deployment through the wicked problem lens 
clarifies the definition, encompassing what appears to be both a necessary role and a 
significant problem at critical incidents.  
This thesis asked the following questions: How can police self-deployment be 
better defined and understood through the lens of wicked problems? How can this 
understanding be used to exploit good police self-deployment, reduce instances of bad self-
deployment, and enhance law-enforcement response to evolving critical incidents that 
employ ICS? To answer these questions, the case narratives from the 2013 Christopher 
Dorner manhunt in southern California and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings were first 
                                                 
4 Dick A. Buck, Joseph E. Trainor, and Benigno E. Aguirre, “A Critical Evaluation of the Incident 
Command System and NIMS,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 3, no. 3 
(2006): 5. 
5 The White House, Management of Domestic Incidents (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5) 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2003), 5.  
6 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy 
Sciences 4 (1973): 155–169. 
 
 xv
examined to identify specific instances of police self-deployment as they related to ICS. 
These incidents were assessed for setting, outcome, and ICS implementation. Then, police 
self-deployment incidents during the Dorner manhunt and in Boston were measured against 
each of Rittel and Webber’s ten characteristics and Mark Wexler’s four moral traits. 
A case study approach provided the opportunity to examine detailed aspects of the 
self-deployment problem in critical incidents. The events examined as case studies—the 
Christopher Dorner manhunt and the Boston Marathon bombings—were chosen for their 
similarities and differences. Both events involved police as the primary responders and 
spanned several days, necessitating the establishment of ICS. In addition, the events 
demonstrated multiple episodes of self-deployment with both good and bad results. The 
event differences highlight the endemic nature of self-deployment to the profession of 
policing. The Boston Marathon bombings were a terrorist incident that occurred at a fixed 
urban event in Massachusetts. The Dorner manhunt involved the search for a murderer on 
an unpredictable rampage throughout southern California, traversing hundreds of miles 
through vastly different climates. The agencies that responded to both incidents had 
different jurisdictional responsibilities and varied in size—from the six officers working a 
shift in Watertown, Massachusetts, to the 1,000 Los Angeles Police officers assigned to 
daily protective details. Nevertheless, both incidents underwent comparable and repeated 
issues with self-deployment.  
This thesis concluded that police self-deployment is a wicked characteristic of law 
enforcement and recommended that law enforcement embrace educational methods to 
improve response. By using open-ended training scenarios, safe spaces for discussion, and 
collaborative problem-solving, officers may assume more responsibility for their actions 
and receive recognition for a positive response. Acceptance of police self-deployment also 
enables supervisors to effectively manage problems by involving street-level officers in 
decisions. A related recommendation is to create a national after-action report database and 
a standardized reporting format. These will encourage nationwide inter-agency and 
professional collaboration—one of the best ways to deal with wicked problems. A 
centralized database can provide a safe and secure place to share relevant information for 
all response agencies. 
 
 xvi
The existing authoritative command structures found in ICS do not encourage the 
ingenuity and creativity often seen when officers self-deploy to a crisis event at the edge 
of chaos. Police officers are accustomed to working in this environment, making do with 
what is available. Nonetheless, ICS authoritative command still fails to prevent the 
negative forms of self-deployment from occurring, as illustrated in the case studies. A final 
policy recommendation is for ICS to recognize the edge of chaos and provide guidance for 
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Police self-deployment refers to the unauthorized response of officers to critical 
incidents. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) mandates first-responder protocol 
to critical incidents using the Incident Command System (ICS), which prohibits self-
deployment. Incident after-action reports have tied police self-deployment to diminished 
officer safety, poor weapons discipline, and command and control failures. These same 
reports also use the term to describe lifesaving or heroic acts such as police transport of 
critically injured victims. As shown in examples from the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing 
and the 2012 Century Theater shooting in Aurora, Colorado, police self-deployment can 
be described as both bad and good. 
On April 20, 1995, a truck loaded with explosives and parked in front of the Alfred 
P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, exploded, destroying the 
building, killing 168 people, and causing extensive damage over several city blocks. The 
devastation required a massive search and recovery effort that lasted for months. In their 
Final Report: Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing, the Oklahoma City Police 
Department describes the mass response of officers to the bombing site as overwhelming 
and challenging to command: 
Throughout this incident, there was a constant concern as to the number of 
officers on-site, their locations and duties. It was determined that personnel 
from a number of agencies were reporting to the site, perimeter and special 
assignments at all hours. Field personnel frequently utilized the personnel 
without on-site command post personnel being advised. Given the nature of 
the disaster, some officers and supervisors left their posts to participate in 
the rescue operations.1 
In contrast, the Oklahoma Department of Civil Emergency Management’s chapter 
in the same report describes the mass response as lifesaving: 
A massive response of public safety agencies, health care providers and the 
general public occurred immediately following the explosion. They entered 
                                                 
1 Oklahoma City Police Department, “Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing After Action 
Report,” in Final Report: Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing, April 19, 1995, 235 (Stillwater, 
OK: Fire Protection Publications, 1996). 
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the collapsed structure and began to remove victims from the building. They 
formed human chains, and as victims were located and uncovered, they 
passed them out of the building and into the street.2 
These examples highlight the confusion surrounding police self-deployment at 
critical incidents. Despite the post-9/11 implementation of federally standardized ICS 
protocols prohibiting self-deployment, the phenomenon still occurs.  
In July 2012, at the midnight screening of The Dark Knight Rises, a gunman entered 
the Century 16 movie theater in Aurora, Colorado. Using tear gas grenades and several 
firearms, he killed twelve and injured over seventy people. Sam McGhee details violations 
of ICS protocol in his description of police response to the Century 16 Theater shooting:  
The initial response lacked a coordinated, formalized mutual aid staging 
area or staging officer, resulting in uncoordinated efforts and confusion. 
Officers from other jurisdictions, at times self-assigned, duplicated efforts 
or engaged in activity not aligned with current needs.3  
This initial response did not align with federal protocol, yet the Tri-Data Division’s 
after-action report describes these same violations as lifesaving measures: 
At least 27 victims were transported to hospitals in police cars, with at least 
one officer making multiple round trips. If police officers had not decided 
to transport victims without waiting for ICS approval, which was outside of 
existing protocols at the time, a few more victims likely would have died, 
according to the hospitals.4 
In both incidents, police self-deployment resulted in crucial lifesaving acts, but also 
contributed to chaos surrounding the incident. 
                                                 
2 Oklahoma City Fire Department, “The Oklahoma City Bombing: Report and Analysis,” In Final 
Report: Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building Bombing, April 19, 1995, 111 (Stillwater, OK: Fire Protection 
Publications, 1996).  
3 Sam McGhee, “The Aurora Theater Shooting Experience: Considerations for Multi-
jurisdictional/Multi-disciplinary Response to Mass Shooting Events,” The Police Chief 83(2016): 24. 
4 TriData Division, Aurora Century 16 Theater Shooting: After Action Report for the City of Aurora, 
Colorado (Arlington, VA: System Planning Corporation, 2014), 18, https://www.courts.state.co.us/Media/ 
Opinion_Docs/14CV31595%20After%20Action%20Review%20Report%20Redacted.pdf. System 
Planning Corporation’s TriData division is a public safety consulting firm, specializing in research, 
analyses, and management studies in fire protection and emergency medical services, prevention and 
preparedness, and homeland security. See http://www.sysplan.com/capabilities/fire_ems/. 
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Police self-deployment resists clear definition and any attempts at elimination.5 
These characteristics are common to “wicked problems,” a concept introduced by Horst 
Rittel and Melvin Webber in the 1970s to distinguish public policy problems that defy 
resolution through traditional scientific methods.6 By viewing police self-deployment 
through the wicked problem lens, this thesis clarifies its definition—encompassing what 
appears to be both a necessary role and a significant problem at critical incidents. 
A. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis asks the following questions: How can police self-deployment be better 
defined and understood through the lens of wicked problems? How can this understanding 
be used to exploit good police self-deployment, reduce instances of bad self-deployment, 
and enhance law-enforcement response to evolving critical incidents that employ ICS?  
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Defining—and thus influencing—police self-deployment is difficult. If the results 
of police self-deployment to a critical incident are undesirable or harmful, then self-
deployment is condemned.7 For example, in the Oklahoma City bombing and the Century 
Theater shooting, self-deployment led to significant challenges with incident command and 
control, which contributed to the chaos.8 Conversely, if a large number of officers respond 
to an event without authorization and perform—if only in hindsight—daring and creative 
acts such as the emergency medical transport of victims in cruisers, then these officers are 
cited as heroes and their actions credited with a successful operation.  
A basic understanding of federal protocol is necessary to clearly view the role of 
police self-deployment in incident response. Since 9/11, command and control of resources 
                                                 
5 Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy 
Sciences 4 (1973): 161; Horst W.J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of 
Planning,” Policy Sciences 4 (1973):163. 
6 Ibid., 160. 
7 The term “condemned” here refers to incidents in which self-deployment is cited in after-action 
documents and case study discussion in this thesis. 
8 Oklahoma City Police Department, :Alfred P. Murrah After Action Report,” 239; McGhee, “Aurora 
Theater Shooting Experience,” 24. 
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at critical incidents means application of the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), of which ICS is one tool.9 DHS describes NIMS as a “systematic, proactive 
approach to guide all levels of government, nongovernmental organizations (NGO), and 
the private sector to work together to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and 
recover from the effects of incidents in an all-hazards context.”10 NIMS employs ICS as 
that systems approach. The DHS premise is that a “common incident management 
framework” will enable first response agencies to coordinate in five areas: preparedness, 
communications and information management, resources, command and control, and 
ongoing maintenance and management.11  
Historically, ICS was developed by the fire service in the 1970s, after several years 
of uncoordinated response to California wildfires resulted in extensive loss of life and 
property. Several agencies joined forces and devised a system to coordinate response, 
utilizing resources and communications more efficiently. Their success over several years 
led to nationwide adoption of ICS by most fire departments. The system gradually 
expanded to include other large-scale, multi-agency events and emergencies. In the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the newly created Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
facilitated a national effort to “consolidate, expand, and enhance the previous efforts.”12 In 
2004, DHS, through presidential directives, mandated that ICS be used as the official 
template for incident response to critical incidents, connecting federal funding to its use by 
partner agencies.13 This mandate forces police agencies, which did not adopt ICS, to train 
officers and implement applicable response protocols to align with ICS requirements. 
                                                 
9 Department of Homeland Security (DHS), National Incident Management System (Washington, DC: 
GPO, 2008), 1. 
10 FEMA, “Working Draft: National Incident Management System Refresh,” Center for Threat 
Preparedness, May 2, 2016, 1, http://www.dhhr.wv.gov/healthprep/eventsandannouncements/Pages/NIMS-
Refresh-Engagement-Update.aspx.  
11 DHS, NIMS, 7. 
12 FEMA, “Working Draft,” 4.  
13 The White House, Management of Domestic Incidents (Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5) 
(Washington, DC: White House, 2003), 5.  
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C. RESEARCH DESIGN 
A case study approach provides the opportunity to examine detailed aspects of the 
self-deployment problem in specific environments. According to Robert K. Yin, “a case 
study approach is the preferred method when the main research questions are ‘how’ or 
‘why’ questions, the researcher has little or no control over behavioral events and the focus 
of study is a contemporary phenomenon.”14 Police self-deployment is most problematic at 
critical or “black swan” events. These events are memorialized in after-action reports, 
which detail positive and negative aspects of the response as well as recommendations for 
future events. The limitation of after-action reports is their reliance on a hindsight view of 
the event. Application of wicked problem characteristics to the cases allows for a different 
interpretation of the events, which can resolve some confusion about the response. 
Previous study examines the relationship between ICS and police response, 
identifying a period labeled “the edge of chaos” and appraising the relationship between 
critical events and emergency response protocols as wicked problems.15 This thesis 
narrows that focus to police self-deployment as a wicked problem in two events, the 2013 
Christopher Dorner manhunt and the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings. 
These two events, examined as case studies, are examples of incidents that have 
primary police involvement and wicked problem characteristics. Multiple case studies 
were chosen to illuminate how self-deployment is endemic to law enforcement and, 
therefore, a characteristic rather than a problem. These two particular incidents were 
chosen for their similarities and differences. Similarly, both events involve police as the 
primary responders and occur over several days, requiring the establishment of ICS. Also, 
both events include multiple episodes of self-deployment with both good and bad results. 
The event differences highlight the endemic nature of self-deployment to the profession of 
policing. The Dorner manhunt involved the search for a murderer on an unpredictable 
                                                 
14 Robert K. Yin, Case Study Research Design and Methods, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: Sage, 2014), 2. 
15 Explained in more detail in Chapter II. See Cynthia E. Renaud, “Making Sense in the Edge of 
Chaos: A Framework for Effective Initial Response Efforts to Large-Scale Incidents” (master’s thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2010); Angi English, “Ten Properties of Wicked Problems,” Medium, June 13, 
2016, https://medium.com/homeland-security/ten-properties-of-wicked-problems-a8a9ff67ccdb#.xx4yyjcsl.  
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rampage throughout southern California, traversing hundreds of miles through vastly 
different climates. The Boston Marathon bombings were a terrorist incident that occurred 
at a fixed urban event in Massachusetts. The agencies that responded to both incidents have 
different jurisdictional responsibilities and are of varying sizes—from the massive amount 
of personnel assigned to protective details by the LAPD to the six officers working the 
midnight shift in Watertown, Massachusetts. Nevertheless, both incidents have comparable 
experiences with self-deployment.  
Source material for the case studies was drawn from theoretical literature, publicly 
available after-action reports, government documents, media and other accounts, and 
reviews of both events. The narratives and the analysis focus on law enforcement response 
and specific instances of police self-deployment, looking only briefly at the totality of the 
events. Other events considered for the case study include the 2013 shooting at the 
Washington Navy Shipyard, the 2015 San Bernardino terror attack, the 2016 Pulse 
Nightclub shooting, and the 2012 Century Theater shooting. While each of these events 
documents instances of police self-deployment, their rapid conclusions produce less data 
for analysis. 
This thesis analyzes the case narratives to identify instances of police self-
deployment and to search them for characteristics of wicked problems. Table 1 provides 
the first part of the analytical tool used for this study, whereby the incidents of police self-
deployment as described in each event are compared to a grid describing the characteristics 
of wicked problems. In the table, the first column names the characteristics of wicked 
problems as described by Rittel and Webber, and the second column provides explanations. 
Overlapping with Rittel and Webber’s characteristics are Mark Wexler’s four moral 
characteristics, which apply specifically to public policy wicked problems (discussed in 




Table 1.   Wicked Problems Analytical Tool, Part 116 
Rittel and Webber’s Ten Characteristics of Wicked Problems 
 Wicked Problem Characteristic Description 
1. “There is no definitive formulation 
of a wicked problem.”17 
“The formulation is the problem. The process of 
formulating the problem and of conceiving a 
solution (or re-solution) is identical, since every 
specification of the problem is a specification of the 
direction in which a treatment is considered.”18 
2. “Wicked problems have no 
stopping rule.”19 
“There are no criteria that tell when a solution has 
been found. The process of solving the problem is 
identical with the process of understanding its 
nature. The planner terminates work on a wicked 
problem not for reasons inherent in the logic of the 
problem.”20 
3. “Solutions to wicked problems are 
not true or false, but bad or 
good.”21 
“There are no ‘conventionalized criteria’—many 
parties are equally equipped, interested and/or 
entitled to judge the solutions, although none has the 
power to set formal decision rules to determine 
correctness.”22 
4. “There is no immediate and no 
ultimate test of a solution to a 
wicked problem.”23 
“Any solution, after being implemented, will 
generate waves of consequences over an extended-
—virtually an unbounded—-period of time.”24 
5. “Every solution to a wicked 
problem is a one-shot operation.”25 
“Whenever actions are effectively irreversible and 
whenever the half-lives of the consequences are 
long, every trial counts. And every attempt to 
reverse a decision or to correct for the undesired 
consequences poses another set of wicked problems, 
which are in turn subject to the same dilemmas.”26 
                                                 
16 For the full, combined, analytical tool, see the Appendix. 
17 Horst W. J. Rittel and Melvin M. Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning,” Policy 
Sciences 4, (1973): 161. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., 162. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 







 Wicked Problem Characteristic Description 
6. “Wicked problems do not have an 
enumerable (or an exhaustively 
describable) set of potential 
solutions, nor is there a well-
described set of permissible 
operations that may be 
incorporated into the plan.”27 
“There are no criteria which enable one to prove that 
all solutions to a wicked problem have been 
identified and considered.”28 
7. “Every wicked problem is 
essentially unique.”29 
“Despite long lists of similarities between a current 
problem and a previous one, there always might be 
an additional distinguishing property that is of 
overriding importance.”30 
8. “Every wicked problem can be 
considered a symptom of another 
problem.”31 
“The process of resolving the problem starts with the 
search for causal explanation of the discrepancy. 
Removal of that cause poses another problem of 
which the original problem is a ‘symptom.’ In turn, 
it can be considered the symptom of still another 
‘higher-level’ problem.”32 
9.  “The existence of a discrepancy 
representing a wicked problem can 
be explained in numerous ways. 
The choice of explanation 
determines the nature of the 
problem’s resolution.”33 
“There is no rule or procedure to determine the 
‘correct’ explanation or combination of them. The 
reason is that in dealing with wicked problems there 
are several more ways of refuting a hypothesis than 
there are permissible in the sciences.”34 
10.  “The planner has no right to be 
wrong.”35 
“Planners dealing with wicked problems are liable 
for the consequences of the actions they generate; 
the effects can matter a great deal to those people 
that are touched by those actions.”36 
 
                                                 




31 Ibid., 165. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid., 166. 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., 167. 
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D. CHAPTER OVERVIEW 
Chapter II reviews the relevant research and literature on police self-deployment, 
ICS, and wicked problems. Chapter III chronicles the 2013 Christopher Dorner manhunt 
and Chapter IV the 2013 Boston Marathon bombings, focusing on incidents of police self-
deployment. Chapter V evaluates specific instances of self-deployment in each incident as 
they relate to ICS. Chapter VI uses the wicked problems analytical tool (developed through 
Chapters I and II, and provided in full in the Appendix) to analyze police self-deployment 
in the Dorner manhunt and Boston Marathon bombings. Chapter VII draws conclusions 
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II. DEFINITIONS: A LITERATURE REVIEW 
This chapter explores existing research on the definitions of police self-
deployment, how that literature relates to the Incident Command System (ICS), and wicked 
problems concepts. The limited literature on police self-deployment is confined mostly to 
descriptions of response behavior in event after-action reports. Examining the relationship 
between ICS as a federally mandated protocol and police response to critical incidents 
provides framing for problems faced by law enforcement. A review of the theoretical 
writings of Horst Rittel and others discusses the prevalence of wicked problems in incident 
response and police self-deployment. 
A. DEFINING POLICE SELF-DEPLOYMENT 
Despite the vast number of after-action reports and media accounts of police self-
deployment, no comprehensive definition for the term exists. In the absence of a definition, 
discussing the terms used to describe behaviors attributed to police self-deployment 
provides a starting point for detecting instances of its practice in the narratives presented 
in Chapters III and IV. Recognition of these terms also clearly illustrates the confusion 
surrounding a definition of police self-deployment. The after-action report authors identify 
and describe causal factors for problems with officer safety, traffic congestion, and 
command and control. Although this thesis uses those descriptions to loosely define police 
self-deployment, no complete or conclusive meaning exists. 
In its after-action report of the Christopher Dorner manhunt, the Police Foundation 
identifies several instances of self-deployment. First, the authors describe self-deployment 
as “the independent action of an individual or individuals to an incident without the ability 
to immediately intervene in an on-going situation or without a request from the jurisdiction 
in command.”37 Individual or independent agency are key terms consistently used in after-
action reports identifying self-deployment. In combination with the term unrequested, 
these terms suggest that self-deploying officers are “going rogue,” acting for their own self-
                                                 
37 Police Foundation, Police under Attack: Southern California Law Enforcement Response to the 
Attacks by Christopher Dorner (Washington, DC: Police Foundation, 2014), 54. 
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interest rather than that of the public’s safety. Describing the scene surrounding the Boston 
Marathon bombings, Leonard et al. portray self-deployment as an individual response: 
“There were many self-deployments or self-reassignments in the sense that the movement 
was initiated by the individual rather than as the result of a mutual assistance request 
transmitted between agencies and then affirmatively or systematically from a dispatcher to 
a unit.”38 The request is narrowly defined as originating from an agency or mutual 
assistance agreement, contributing to the impression that a self-deploying officer is a rogue 
officer. Timing also plays a role. Sudden or unexpected are also terms used to describe 
police self-deployment; for instance, a news report from Boston stated, “The fast-moving 
situation was made worse by the sudden arrival of police officers who showed up in 
Watertown without being called—so-called self-deployment.”39 The implication here is 
that self-deploying officers are impulsive and respond without regard for protocol. 
Typically, this description is portrayed through photographs of abandoned police cars 
parked haphazardly, blocking access to or egress from a crisis scene.  
One reason the definition of police self-deployment is ambiguous is because the 
same principles used to describe rogue officers may also be used to describe heroic officers. 
These same descriptions are used when police self-deployment results in life-saving 
actions—such as officers, without request and in violation of protocol, transporting victims 
from the Century Theater shooting to the hospital. Alternatively, San Bernardino Police 
Chief Jarrod Burguan uses the terms disciplined and undisciplined to describe self-
deployment in the 2013 Dorner manhunt and the 2015 Inland Revenue Center shooting: 
There’s a difference between disciplined and undisciplined self-deployment 
… we pay cops a lot of money, and we expect them to accept responsibility 
for the things that they do. And part of that responsibility is knowing when 
you’re needed at some place, and going, and knowing when just to be 
disciplined and stay back and doing what needs to be done here. Both kinds 
of self-deployment happened with the Dorner manhunt and later at the IRC 
                                                 
38 Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard et al., Why Was Boston Strong? (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy 
School, 2014), 37, https://ash.harvard.edu/files/why_was_boston_strong.pdf. 
39 Phillip Martin, Hilary Sargent, and James Edwards, “‘Self-Deployment’ May Have Caused 





shooting. There were people who were self-deployed and were tactically 
deployed, or put to work, in civilian-speak, and those that got in the way.40 
Chief Burguan describes the struggle between positive self-deployment, whereby officers 
are integrated into the response, and the negative connotation ascribed to undisciplined 
self-deployment, whereby unassigned officers impede response. That both positive and 
negative self-deployment exists simultaneously is unique to law enforcement. This is due 
to the positive role self-initiated activity plays in policing. The Police Foundation report on 
the Dorner manhunt specifically distinguishes self-initiated police activity—“the response 
to a situation witnessed by an officer or in response to a scene where the officer may take 
immediate action to assist in an evolving on-going incident”—from self-deployment—“the 
independent action of an individual or individuals to an incident without the ability to 
immediately intervene in an on-going situation or without a request from the jurisdiction 
in command.”41 The authors detail self-initiated activity as an integral and positive form 
of policing, explaining that “basic law enforcement training teaches officers to handle 
situations on their own. They are trained to seek out opportunities to perform the task 
assigned to them and self-initiate in the interest of public safety. Agencies measure and 
evaluate officers based on self-initiated activity.”42 Officers who self-initiate their activity 
are praised for their innovation and ingenuity. Their actions are not those of a rogue officer. 
The difference between self-initiated and self-deployed response seems to rest on an 
individual officer’s assessment of timing—the immediacy of the need for law enforcement 
action. 
Notably, the terms used to describe police self-deployment—independent or 
individual agency, unrequested or unauthorized response, and disciplined or undisciplined 
activity—are almost identical to those used to define self-initiated activity. Moreover, 
newer law enforcement theories such as community policing (COP) and problem-oriented 
                                                 
40 Beau Yarbrough, “How a 2013 Manhunt Helped Prepare San Bernardino Police for a Terrorist 
Attack,” Inland Valley Daily Bulletin, February 15, 2016, https://www.policeone.com/patrol-
issues/articles/75468006-How-a-2013-manhunt-helped-prepare-San-Bernardino-police-for-a-terrorist-
attack/. 




policing (POP) support this independence and transfer decision-making responsibility to 
the front-line officer. As the Department of Justice’s Office of Community Orientated 
Policing Services explains: 
Decentralized decision making involves flattening the hierarchy of the 
agency, increasing tolerance for risk taking in problem-solving efforts, and 
allowing officers discretion in handling calls. ... [It] allows frontline officers 
to take responsibility for their role in community policing. When an officer 
is able to create solutions to problems and take risks, he or she ultimately 
feels accountable for those solutions and assumes a greater responsibility 
for the well-being of the community. In addition, providing sufficient 
authority to coordinate various resources to attack a problem and allowing 
officers the autonomy to establish relationships with the community will 
help define problems and develop possible solutions.43 
Most of the 18,000 or more police departments in the United States have adopted some 
form of community policing and self-initiated activity in the form of daily contacts, 
community efforts, and creative solutions to problems. These activities are integrated into 
an officer’s daily assignments through positive evaluations and adjusted patrols. 
Self-deployment in policing is identified as mostly problematic—unless an officer 
can be used at a scene or commits a heroic act. Self-initiated activity is promoted and 
rewarded, yet the definition is so closely aligned with self-deployment that widespread 
confusion exists about the nuances. When incident examples are used to define self-
deployment, both heroic and negative events are identified. Without clear principles, 
preventing symptoms of self-deployment such as traffic congestion and diminished 
command and control is challenging; nevertheless, encouraging the ingenuity and initiative 
leading to heroic and lifesaving acts is equally difficult.  
B. DEFINING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ICS AND LAW 
ENFORCEMENT 
The fire service is both the originator and the champion of successful ICS 
implementation in day-to-day operations and at large-scale, multi-agency incidents. In law 
enforcement, however, practitioners, policy makers, and researchers “recognize that ICS 
                                                 




has been most successful among firefighting organizations and less successful with law 
enforcement.”44 Unlike firefighting, law enforcement has little use for ICS in daily 
operations. ICS training documents acknowledge that first responders handle more than 95 
percent of all incidents without a formal plan.45 This is especially true of police agencies 
in which officers self-initiate stops and resolve dispatched calls as a solo patrol. Dick Buck 
et al. tie this disuse directly to an officer’s failure to utilize ICS at large-scale events:  
Police officers who first arrive at the scene resolve most incidents. While 
they may require some reinforcement, other officers in their precinct usually 
accomplish this. Thus, when the time comes to participate in a complex 
disaster involving multiple agencies where ICS could be helpful, law 
enforcement personnel are not familiar enough with it to implement it 
successfully.46 
Additionally, ICS training and certification is laborious, especially for agencies that do not 
use it daily. In his master’s thesis, Eric Seibel acknowledges that advanced ICS training is 
time consuming, available primarily to firefighters, and dependent upon individual 
participation at critical events, exercises, and pre-planned events. To become a fully 
qualified incident manager in ICS requires 433 hours of training plus certification through 
event experience.47 There is little incentive for law enforcement command to provide this 
amount of training for what are essentially black swan events. 
In her master’s thesis, Cynthia Renaud argues that ICS is also unresponsive to 
violent incidents, typically those that are driven by unpredictable or criminal human 
behavior and primary police response. Renaud identifies the ICS failure point as 
corresponding to a specific period, that of the initial turmoil inherent at the outset of every 
incident. She compares it to a term used in biology coined the edge of chaos: 
                                                 
44 Dick A. Buck, Joseph E. Trainor, and Benigno E. Aguirre, “A Critical Evaluation of the Incident 
Command System and NIMS,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management 3, no. 3 
(2006): 5. 
45 FEMA, Introduction to the Incident Command System (ICS-100): Instructor Guide (Washington, 
DC: Department of Homeland Security, 2013), 2.39. 
46 Buck, Trainor, and Benigno, “Critical Evaluation,” 4. 
47 Eric J. Seibel, “Missing the Mark: Is ICS Training Achieving its Goal?” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2016), 57.  
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Molecular biologists studying cells have discovered an edge to every cell 
where individual agents interact with each other and their environment in 
an atmosphere of disorder and seeming turmoil. Out of that chaos, order can 
emerge. If an order does emerge, the type ultimately determines whether the 
cell lives or dies. Scientists have named this area of the cell “the edge of 
chaos.”48 
Arguing that the edge of chaos is resistant to the forms and structure of NIMS, Renaud 
suggests that improvisation and creativity—hallmarks of self-initiated policing—are the 
best tools for responders during this period.49 
In his master’s thesis, Theodore Moody concurs with Renaud’s view, especially 
when ICS is employed at terrorist events. “NIMS/ICS is a tool that is useful in managing 
some phases of the response to some incidents faced by law enforcement, but may not 
function well in the chaotic first phase of a law enforcement response to an extreme and 
novel event—such as an act of paramilitary terrorism.”50 Like Renaud, he reasons that the 
forms and structural procedures inherent to ICS do not allow for the creativity needed for 
response to a paramilitary or terrorist attack, during which the perpetrator may be 
unidentified and future danger is unpredictable. 
Basic ICS training, which most police officers have completed due to federal 
mandate, occurs through classroom presentations with little association to real-life 
experience. ICS-200, the basic class that introduces responders to the system, mentions this 
chaotic early period once and offers no clear guidance; the coursework pertaining to later 
stages of incident response, however, provides specific protocols, personnel assignments 
and forms.51 Renaud suggests that incident command and a path to the resolution of the 
incident must be determined before ICS can be established, something that is not conducive 
to the first  minutes of a complex, critical  event. The ICS system fails to recognize this 
period or provide any support, instruction, or guidance to first responders who function 
                                                 
48 Renaud, “Making Sense in the Edge of Chaos,” 10.  
49 Ibid., 11. 
50 Theodore J. Moody, “Filling the Gap between NIMS/ICS and the Law Enforcement Initial 
Response in the Age of Urban Jihad,” (master’s thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 2010), 1. 
51 Seibel, “Missing the Mark,” 65. 
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during this time. More clearly illustrated in future chapters of this thesis, the edge of chaos 
is also the period in which positive police self-deployment occurs.  
Leonard et al. recognize that NIMS and ICS at the Boston Marathon bombings was 
successful at the “macro level,” improving cooperation and coordination between the 
leadership of the many agencies that responded. They identify problems, however, at the 
tactical or “micro level,” where individual agents from various disciplines must work 
together to solve the problem. They suggest that proper identification of the type of 
command might be the solution. “At the macro-level, the process of leadership and 
management tends to be collaborative and to focus on cooperation and coordination, but 
in tactical situations definitive and authoritative command is an essential resource.”52 
Unlike unified command, which is based on collaboration between agency chiefs, tactical-
level commanders must provide quick and decisive answers so that immediate action may 
be taken. Per Leonard et al., “Someone needs to be ‘in charge’—and those present need to 
recognize who that is and to accept it—or grave and unnecessary danger can be created for 
responders present at the scene, civilians nearby, and suspects.”53 Identifying that 
“someone” is at the crux of the issue for both ICS and police self-deployment, especially 
in situations involving response from many different agencies or during the edge of chaos. 
Critical events are inherently complex; criminal events such as terrorism or active 
shooter situations are even more complicated, with potentially deadly repercussions. In her 
article “Terrorism as a Wicked Problem,” Angela English argues that the command-and-
control model currently in use is ineffective against complex threats. “The nature of 
complexity is that no one individual has the entire answer which highlights the need for 
people and all levels of community to cooperate with each other on our nation’s 
challenges.”54 Terrorist events require collaborative response at both the macro and micro 
levels of command. In ICS, collaborative leadership is essential for successful unified 
command. At the micro or street level, ICS requires authoritative command, which is not 
                                                 
52 Leonard et al., Why Was Boston Strong, 38. 
53 Ibid. 




collaborative. Events at the edge of chaos, especially terrorist and criminal events, seem to 
require a fluid response that is neither strictly authoritative nor collaborative. This 
complexity and resistance to solutions are characteristic of wicked problems. Analyzing 
the defining characteristics of wicked problems may help reveal why ICS is ineffective in 
the early chaotic minutes of an event and why police self-deployment may actually be part 
of the solution.  
C. DEFINING WICKED PROBLEMS  
Wicked problems, identified by Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber as unique to the 
realm of public policy, span such intractable topics as poverty, terrorism, and the 
environment. Wicked problems cannot be solved by traditional scientific methods. They 
exist in opposition to natural science problems, or “those that are definable and separable 
and may have solutions that are findable.”55 Rittel and Webber use the terms malignant, 
vicious, tricky, and aggressive to describe wicked problems.56  
Rittel and Webber created ten characteristics that identify problems as wicked 
(shown in Table 2). John Camillus clarifies that “these characteristics are not a set of tests 
that mechanically determine wickedness; rather, they provide insights that help someone 
judge whether a problem is wicked.”57 Notably, a wicked problem does not need to meet 





                                                 
55 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory,” 160. 
56 Ibid. 
57 John Camillus, Wicked Strategies: How Companies Conquer Complexity and Confound 
Competitors (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2016), 2. 
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Table 2.   Wicked Problem Characteristics58 
1. There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem. 
2. Wicked problems have no stopping rule. 
3. Solutions are not true or false, but bad or good. 
4. Wicked problems have no immediate or ultimate test of a solution. 
5. Every solution is a one-shot operation. 
6. 
Wicked problems do not have an enumerable set of potential solutions, nor is there a 
well-described set of permissible operations that may be incorporated into the plan. 
7. Every wicked problem is essentially unique. 
8. Every wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another problem. 
9. 
The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be explained in 
numerous ways. The choice of explanation determines the nature of the problem’s 
resolution. 
10. The planner has no right to be wrong. 
 
Since Rittel and Webber’s original discussion in the 1970s, wicked problems have 
been identified in business, project design, and software development. That body of 
literature suggests that wicked problems are complex, but not unsolvable; they require a 
different form of attack.59 C. West Churchman identifies these false solutions as a moral 
conundrum inherent in public policy wicked problems. He argues that wicked problems by 
definition cannot be solved, so those who claim to provide solutions to the whole or even 
parts of the problem are, in turn, morally wrong.60 He charges the problem tamer with a 
higher level of responsibility. Mark Wexler, focusing on the moral dilemmas of wicked 
problems, calls these solutions deceptive, as they divert attention from the wicked problem 
                                                 
58 Adapted from Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory.” 
59 Mary T. Tyszkiewicz, Edward R. McCleskey, and Russell Miller, “Updating the National Planning 
Scenarios: Using Wicked Problems and Capability-Based Planning Concepts for Homeland Security,” 
Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, 9 no.4 (2012): 1550. See also John Camillus, 
“Strategy as a Wicked Problem,” Harvard Business Review (May 2008): 1–11; Peter Conklin, Peter 
DeGrace, and Leslie Stahl, Wicked Problems, Righteous Solutions; A Catalogue of Modern Software 
Engineering Paradigms (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Yourdon Press, 1990). 
60 C. West Churchman, “Wicked Problems,” Management Science 14, no.4 (1967): 142. 
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toward principled approaches and software programs—in short, a new “knowledge 
frontier.”61  
Mark Wexler expands upon Churchman’s article and identifies four moral concerns 
in wicked problems: “the responsibility nexus; the risk of false assurance; the politics of 
urgency or criticality and avoidance of the unsolvable problems” (also shown in Table 3).62 
In the responsibility nexus, the fact that a wicked problem is considered unsolvable adds 
weight to a problem solver’s belief that his assessments are unique.63 This prevents a 
complete evaluation of the problem. That same problem solver may fall into the risk of 
false assurance when giving advice or suggesting solutions. Wicked problems have no 
definitive formulation, making risks impossible to identify and evaluate. Problem solvers 
may then “promise more than they can deliver.”64 In the politics of urgency, by stressing 
an immediate solution, the problem solver may be providing a false solution to a problem 
that remains, at its core, unsolvable.65 Finally, in confusion over wicked problems, it may 
be hard or even impossible to differentiate between tame and wicked problems, leaving the 
problem solver with no definitive way to ameliorate this confusion.66 
  
                                                 
61 Mark N. Wexler, “Exploring the Moral Dimension of Wicked Problems,” The International Journal 
of Sociology and Social Policy 29, no. 9. (2009): 532, doi: 10.1108/01443330910986306. 
62 Ibid., 536. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid., 537. 




Table 3.   Wicked Problems Analytical Tool, Part 267 
WEXLER’S MORAL CHARACTERISTICS 
 
The Responsibility Nexus  
“Wicked problem contexts license innovation or, at least, the claimants’ (knowledge sellers’) 
belief that their views are purportedly new and original.”68 
 
The Risk of False Assurance 
“The more wicked the problem, the harder it is for well-intended problem solvers to educate 
about risk. In their determination to push the knowledge frontier and distinguish themselves by 
their claims, they may promise more than they can deliver.”69 
 
The Politics of Urgency 
“Political refers to the manner in which the attention-getting use of “urgency” can be used to 
rally others about a cause of which one claims to have the best answer. The call to urgency 
justifies lower scrutiny and monitoring of the solution.”70 
 
Confusion over Wicked Problem Solutions 
“A portion of wicked problems are, unsolvable, but the tame-wicked problem is unclear on how 
to distinguish these from other wicked problems that, with great effort, are solvable.”71 
 
Mary Tyszkiewicz et al. examine how homeland security planners prepare for 
future events, specifically how they administer drills and exercises, key preparation 
components of NIMS and ICS. They posit that homeland security planners, echoing their 
corporate counterparts, try to solve rather than tame wicked problems. In tabletop exercises 
and drills, this is most obvious in the use of scenarios with logical and pre-planned 
outcomes. The reality of an event, however, produces unexpected and unpredictable events 
as it develops, causing responders to divert resources, change plans, and pivot direction. 
To combat this, Tyskiewicz et al. recommend planners incorporate wicked problems into 
the national planning scenarios, creating events that have no “correct” resolution.72 This 
allows responders to practice creative solutions to problems as they occur without risk of 
                                                 
67 For the full, combined analytical tool, see the Appendix. 
68 Wexler, “Exploring Wicked Problems,” 537. 
69 Ibid.  
70 Ibid., 538. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Tyszkiewicz, McCleskey and Miller, “Updating the National Planning Scenarios,” 7.  
 
 22
disastrous “real” consequences. Svante Edzen also suggests that planners should 
incorporate wicked problems into exercises. This allows participants to identify and tame 
the problems collaboratively within the exercise and utilize existing plans and lessons 
learned from previous events to resolve problems.73 Both recommendations are more 
closely in line with the timelines of terrorist or criminal events and more applicable to law 
enforcement response.  
ICS employs strict channels of authority and procedures for responders. While there 
is collaboration occurring between chiefs and agency leaders—unified command—there is 
less within lower levels of incident command. At the tactical level, command is 
authoritative; line officers are expected to follow orders. Keith Grint suggests that this 
linear decision-making structure in crisis leadership (that of ICS) is itself a wicked 
problem. Reflecting Churchman and Wexler’s morality theories, he states, “A persuasive 
rendition of the situational context legitimizes a particular form of action that often relates 
to the decision-maker’s preferred mode of engagement, rather than what ‘the situation’ 
apparently demands.”74 Within the less collaborative levels of incident command, the 
direction of the incident resolution can become focused on the commander rather than what 
is best for the event. Cynthia Renaud connects this tactical command problem specifically 
to ICS procedures. Incident commanders, per ICS, focus on a resolution of the emergent 
issue rather than complete understanding of the problem. This desire for efficiency can lead 
them to take action “even if they are not quite sure yet what they have or what they should 
be trying to accomplish.”75 If the tactical commander’s focus is on giving clear orders 
without consideration of the overall problem, the entire direction of the response may be 
affected negatively. 
                                                 
73 Svante Edzen, “Table-Top Exercises for Emergency Management: Tame Solutions for Wicked 
Problems,” 47th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (March 2014): 1978, 
doi:10.1109/HICSS.2014.250. 
74 Keith Grint, “Problems, Problems, Problems: The Social Construction of ‘Leadership,’” Human 
Relations, 58, no.11 (2016): 1467. 
75 Cynthia E. Renaud, “The Missing Piece of NIMS: Teaching Incident Commanders How to Function 
in the Edge of Chaos,” Homeland Security Affairs 8, no. 1 (2012): 5. 
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According to Nancy Roberts, taming wicked problems requires “a process of 
collaboration and consensus.”76 Churchman recognizes this cooperative effort as one that 
“tames the growl of the wicked problem.”77 Yet collaboration, consensus, and cooperation 
take time—which is often unavailable in the early moments of a critical incident, as Renaud 
notes. Accordingly, collaboration is effective at the level of unified command but at odds 
with the authoritative command structures of ICS at the tactical level. 
NIMS and ICS strive to identify, control, and solve problems caused by critical 
incidents. Suggesting that ICS or NIMS can solve rather than tame a critical incident may 
actually be a wicked problem in and of itself. Police self-deployment, when successful or 
positive, may provide a collaborative process to tame an event during the edge of chaos. 
Embracing that collaborative process is currently not part of the ICS literature, which 
means that law enforcement remains officially prohibited from even positive self-
deployment in critical incidents. 
Self-deployment in policing has both positive and negative attributes. Some self-
deployment results in heroic actions, but it can also be attributed to problems with traffic 
control and officer safety. As previously mentioned, self-deployment may also be confused 
with self-initiated activity. Independence, individual responsibility, and creativity at the 
front lines are not only encouraged but part of the professional policing models in 
community and problem-oriented policing. These models do not conform to the prohibition 
on self-deployment in ICS. The channelized processes and structures of ICS at the tactical 
level require adherence to command protocols. If these command protocols are enforced 
by an incident commander without regard for the total problem, the entire direction of the 
response may be negatively influenced. This is especially apparent during the edge of 
chaos. 
Many of the events and problems that law enforcement responds to are defined as 
wicked problems. Unknowingly, officers tame rather than solve problems on a daily basis. 
                                                 
76 Nancy Roberts, “Coping with Wicked Problems: The Case of Afghanistan,” in Learning from 
International Public Management Reform: Part B, Volume 11, eds. Lawrence Jones, James Guthrie, and 
Peter Steane, 353–375 (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group, 2001), 372. 
77 Churchman. “Wicked Problems,” 141. 
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To tame wicked problems, collaboration between problem solvers is essential. Within ICS, 
unified command uses collaboration; at the tactical level, and most especially during the 
edge of chaos, however, authoritative command is prevalent. Authoritative command does 
not encourage the ingenuity and creativity that is often seen when officers self-deploy to a 
crisis event during the edge of chaos. Nonetheless, ICS authoritative command still fails to 
prevent the negative forms of self-deployment from occurring. 
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III. CASE STUDY NARRATIVE: 2013 CHRISTOPHER DORNER 
MANHUNT 
On February 3, 2013, Christopher Dorner began a murderous rampage in southern 
California, seeking revenge for his termination from the Los Angeles Police Department 
(LAPD) four years earlier. He targeted law enforcement officers, their families, and others 
he felt were connected to his grievances. Dorner killed four and wounded three during the 
manhunt; three civilians were also accidentally shot by police. The rampage ended with a 
deadly stand-off at a rural cabin on February 12, 2013. This narrative is not a 
comprehensive portrayal of all events that occurred or all agencies that responded. The 
focus is on incidents of police self-deployment and the circumstances that surrounded 
them.  
A. SUNDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2013 
At 9:00 p.m., the bodies of Monica Quan and her fiancé Keith Lawrence are 
discovered in Lawrence’s parked car at their condominium in Irvine, California. The car is 
still running and its headlights are on. The crime scene looks like an assassination, or a 
“hit,” as both victims have been shot a total of fourteen times. The Irvine Police Department 
(PD)78 discovers no immediate motives—Monica Quan is still wearing her engagement 
ring. Strangely, no neighbors report hearing the shots. Irvine detectives suspect a weapon 
with a silencer may have been used. Monica Quan was an assistant college basketball coach 
and the daughter of retired LAPD Captain Randal Quan. Keith Lawrence was a campus 
officer at a local college.79 Irvine PD begins an intensive homicide investigation. 
B. MONDAY, FEBRUARY 4, 2013 
About ninety miles south of Irvine and just north of the Mexican border in National 
City, California, an auto worker discovers police equipment while emptying trash into a 
                                                 
78 PD is used as an abbreviation for any police department, not specifically the Irvine department. 
79 Nicole Santa Cruz, Lauren Williams and Kate Mather. “Friends, Investigators Seek answers in 
Killing of O.C. Couple,” Los Angeles Times, February 5, 2013, http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/05/ 
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dumpster. National City Police Department (NCPD) inventories body armor, bullets, a 
ballistic helmet, and pieces of an LAPD uniform including a nameplate engraved with the 
name “Dorner.” In the pocket of the uniform is a notebook with the name and serial number 
of LAPD Officer Teresa Evans. NCPD calls LAPD and leaves a message for Sergeant 
Evans. LAPD tells Irvine PD that no one by the name of Dorner is employed by the 
department.80 
Sergeant Evans calls NCPD back almost immediately, as she is very familiar with 
the name Dorner. According to the Police Foundation,  
In 2007, [Evans] had been partnered with (LAPD) Officer Christopher 
Dorner as his training officer. The partnership had ended in a prolonged 
dispute when Dorner accused her of kicking a suspect during an altercation. 
A disciplinary review hearing had cleared Evans and convinced LAPD 
officials that Dorner had lied because he was about to receive a negative 
review. A Board of Rights hearing had found Dorner guilty of lying, and he 
was fired by the LAPD in 2009. He appealed to the Superior Court and the 
State Court of Appeals over the next two years, but the firing was upheld in 
both courts.81 
Struck by the “spooky” way Dorner stared at her during the hearings, Sergeant Evans 
believes that he still blames her for his firing. Since then, she has remained fearful that 
Dorner would seek revenge.82 
C. TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 5, 2013 
When Sergeant Evans reports to work for the overnight shift, she learns of the 
double homicides of Monica Quan and Keith Lawrence. She remembers that Monica’s 
father, retired LAPD Captain Quan, defended Dorner at his disciplinary hearing, and Evans 
immediately makes the connections among Dorner and Quan, the discovery of the items, 
and the murders. Evans phones the Irvine PD with the alarming information.83 
                                                 
80 “Timeline: The Christopher Dorner Manhunt,” Los Angeles Times, February 8, 2013, 
http://timelines.latimes.com/statewide-manhunt-ex-lapd-officer/; Police Foundation, Police under Attack, 
15. 
81 Police Foundation, Police under Attack, 15. 
82 “Timeline,” Los Angeles Times. 
83 “Timeline,” Los Angeles Times.  
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D. WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 6, 2013 
With the connection to Christopher Dorner established by Sergeant Evans, Irvine 
police drive to National City and view a surveillance video of a large black man matching 
Dorner’s last known appearance removing uniforms and other items from a dark Nissan 
Titan pickup truck with a roof rack and placing them in the dumpster.84 Meanwhile, in 
Irvine, investigators locate what will later be called the “Dorner manifesto” on his 
Facebook page. The memo reads, “From: Christopher Dorner; To: America; Subj: Last 
Resort.” The rambling, 11,000-word document claims the LAPD is corrupt, racist, and 
unfair. Dorner declares “unconventional and asymmetric warfare” on the LAPD, the 
department’s families, and its associates. Listing the names of LAPD officers and their 
families, he threatens, “I never had the opportunity to have a family of my own, I’m 
terminating yours.” He blames the LAPD for his recent unfavorable discharge from the 
Navy Reserve. He boasts about his marksmanship, military experience, and prowess. He 
writes about expecting death from his future actions. In the same document, he also 
catalogs his favorite movies, celebrities, and politicians and leaves long-winded farewell 
messages for his friends. Significantly, he also describes purchasing silencers for his guns 
in Nevada. Irvine police contact the LAPD and immediately establish a multi-agency 
command post.85   
The LAPD assigns protective detail teams to more than forty addresses throughout 
southern California that correspond with the names in Dorner’s manifesto. The list 
eventually swells to seventy-seven, involving the unprecedented assignment of 1,000 
officers daily. By the end of the day, Irvine PD holds a news conference identifying Dorner 
as a suspect in the homicides of Monica Quan and Keith Lawrence and requesting the 
public’s help to locate him.  
Shortly after 10:00 p.m., Dorner tries to hijack a boat in Point Loma, ninety miles 
south of Irvine, in an attempt to escape to Mexican waters. He threatens the 81-year-old 
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owner with a gun and ties him up. An apparently inexperienced boater, Dorner tangles the 
mooring line into the propeller, disabling the boat. He flees.86 
E. THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 7, 2013 
At 1:00 a.m., one hundred miles north of Point Loma near Corona, California, a 
tow-truck driver at a gas station recognizes Dorner and his vehicle from the broadcast 
description. The driver alerts two LAPD officers pulling into the gas station, who are on 
their way to a target address in Corona. Dorner drives by the station as the three of them 
watch. Immediately, the officers pursue him. When the pickup truck disappears down an 
exit ramp, the officers follow and come under intense gunfire, as if Dorner is waiting in 
ambush. A round grazes one officer’s head, and the cruiser is struck, rendering it 
inoperable. With their LAPD radios out of range and cell phones incapacitated, the officers 
are forced to flag down a passing motorist to notify the California Highway Patrol. A 
subsequent investigation reveals that the cruiser was struck twenty-nine times by shots 
fired from a semi-automatic rifle. The officers note they did not hear the shots. Shortly 
after the incident, a “be on the lookout” (BOLO) for Dorner and his Nissan Titan is 
broadcast.87 
At 1:30 a.m., fifteen miles away in Riverside, two officers on routine patrol are 
stopped at a traffic light. Witnesses watch a man driving a dark Nissan pickup roll through 
the red light, draw parallel to the cruiser, point a rifle out his window, and fire over another 
car directly into the cruiser eleven times. One officer is killed almost instantly; the other is 
critically wounded. A witness follows the shooter’s pickup for a short distance and 
identifies it as Dorner’s. A second witness assists the injured officers at the scene. “Officer 
down!” interrupts the BOLO broadcast of the Corona shooting on the radio.88 At 2:00 a.m., 
one hundred miles from Riverside, an abandoned briefcase and LAPD badge belonging to 
Christopher Dorner are found on a street near Lindbergh Field in San Diego.89 
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Three hours later, in Torrance, sixty miles from Riverside, several LAPD officers 
are assigned to a protective detail. Torrance police are aware of the target location, but are 
not actively assigned to the address or in communication with the LAPD officers. All of 
the officers have heard the BOLOs for the seemingly random killings and are on high alert. 
In the Police Foundation report,  LAPD officers on detail describe watching a dark pickup 
truck with its headlights off “move slowly from one side of the street to the other, as if 
seeking a particular address.”90 The truck does not match the description of Dorner’s 
vehicle, but as the truck approaches their position, the officers open fire, shooting as many 
as one hundred times. They shoot and injure the occupants, two Hispanic women, ages 71 
and 42, delivering newspapers.91 
Meanwhile, only a few blocks away, Torrance police stop another pickup turning 
onto the street where the LAPD detail is located. Recognizing that it does not match 
Dorner’s, the officers release the white male driver. As he drives away, the Torrance 
officers hear a fusillade of shots coming from the location of the LAPD detail. Torrance 
officers seize rifles from the patrol vehicle and call out “shots fired” on the radio. A second 
Torrance cruiser on patrol a few blocks away hears the call and responds. The officers in 
the second cruiser see the abandoned first Torrance cruiser, doors wide open, and a pickup 
driving away. Instinctively, the officer driving the second cruiser crashes into the pickup 
truck in an attempt to stop it, and the passenger  officer fires a shot through the windshield. 
Fortunately, the white male operator emerges from the pickup truck uninjured.92 
Nearly five hours later and fifty miles from Riverside in Big Bear, California, a 
recreation and national forest area, police investigate a burning pickup truck believed to be 
Dorner’s. The smoldering vehicle is found abandoned in a location with easy access to the 
ski resorts and cabins along Route 38, one of the few roads in and out of the area. Locating 
Dorner becomes even more urgent when police learn that area resorts are celebrating Police 
and Fire Appreciation Day. The annual event brings many police officers and firefighters 
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to the area. The event is cancelled, and vehicles are required to go through checkpoints to 
leave the mountain area.93 
Securing the pickup as evidence proves problematic as several departments claim 
jurisdiction. The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department negotiates between two 
counties and police departments: Irvine PD, which has a search warrant for the truck based 
on evidence collected from the double homicide, and Riverside PD, which claims the truck 
provides a direct nexus to the murder of one police officer and attacks on three others. The 
situation is resolved, but no organized unity of effort among the departments is 
established.94  
Despite the absence of any formal mutual aid requests, patrol officers, detectives, 
and chiefs of police from all over southern California rush to Big Bear Lake by car and 
helicopter. Most of the officers from the southern regions are ill prepared for the extreme 
cold of the mountain ski resort’s 7,000-foot altitude and have no familiarity with the 
wilderness search area. The Police Foundation’s after-action report states there are several 
incidents of “individuals and small teams of officers conducting searches and activities 
without direction from the incident commander,” based on interviews of responding 
officers.95 
A door-to-door search of the Big Bear area begins, involving hundreds of county 
personnel from different agencies formed into teams. Most of the thousands of cabins in 
the rural and heavily forested area are unoccupied in winter, and many have no radio or 
cell phone reception. Teams must always have an officer in a nearby spot with reception 
to relay information. The San Bernardino County Sheriff’s Department establishes a 
command post at the Bear Mountain Golf Course Clubhouse to oversee the search 
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operations and control the media, who are flooding the region. Big Bear Valley schools are 
placed on lockdown and later closed.96 
CNN anchor Anderson Cooper tweets that he has received a package from Dorner. 
Inside are a note, DVD, and LAPD commemorative coin. The coin, given to Dorner by 
former LAPD Chief William Bratton, who also approved his termination, has what appears 
to be bullet holes through it. Former Chief Bratton’s name is on the manifesto list.97 
F. FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 8, THROUGH MONDAY, FEBRUARY 11, 2013 
A massive winter storm hits the Bear Mountain communities, dumping several feet 
of snow. Temperatures plummet. Searches continues in blizzard conditions. Authorities 
speculate that, unless Dorner has found shelter, the conditions are not conducive to his 
survival. The few roads leading in and out of Big Bear become impassable and are 
temporarily closed.98 
Authorities scale back the search and refocus the massive effort. The command post 
at the golf course is relocated to the Big Bear police substation, where an operations center 
is already running.99 In an effort to communicate with Dorner, the LAPD announces that it 
will review his termination case. The Los Angeles mayor announces a $1 million reward 
for information leading to Dorner’s arrest.100 To process the disjointed and massive amount 
of information the investigation is producing, a joint regional information center opens in 
Norwalk, one hundred miles from Big Bear. Hundreds of tips pour into the Joint Regional 
Intelligence Center, most of them useless.101 False sightings of Dorner over the weekend 
force an evacuation of an apartment complex in San Bernardino and a Lowe’s retail store 
in Northbridge. 
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G. TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 12, 2013 
Five days pass without any confirmed sightings of Christopher Dorner. Local 
schools reopen under heavy security, and area residents begin to return to their normal 
routines as law enforcement continues the investigation. 
Around noon in Big Bear, the owners of a condominium resort enter a unit to clean 
it and find Dorner inside. He gags and ties them up and then steals their car, a Nissan 
Rogue. After about a half hour, the couple free themselves and call 911. A BOLO is 
broadcast. The condo is across the street from the former golf club command post. Based 
on evidence inside the condo, it is determined that Dorner has been holed up inside for 
several days with access to television reports and, worse, the ability to observe 
responders.102 
There are no mutual aid requests, but the sighting causes a rush of law 
enforcement—including officers, supervisors, and executive level staff—up the mountain, 
similar to the February 7 response. A few department chiefs recognize the problem and 
provide specific instructions to their officers to avoid self-deployment. Irvine PD orders its 
detectives back to the Big Bear patrol station, where they interview the condominium 
residents. California Highway Patrol assigns its officers to shut down the few roads to the 
mountain to limit Dorner’s escape. The Corona Police Department issues an order 
specifically prohibiting self-deployment in the Dorner manhunt.103 
Dorner is spotted by police shortly thereafter in the Nissan Rogue, following closely 
behind a school bus to evade the deployment of tire deflation devices. Dorner turns onto 
the rural, snow-covered Glass Road. By the time officers discover the Nissan Rogue, 
crashed in the snow, Dorner has carjacked a white Dodge pickup from a passing motorist. 
Before that information is broadcast, he fires on and disables the pickup truck of a game 
warden responding to the scene. One of the wardens fires his rifle at the fleeing Dorner, 
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but the stolen truck continues. With the broadcast of the new information, officers in the 
area head toward Glass Road.104 
About fifteen minutes later, six officers, in four vehicles and from different 
agencies, pull onto Seven Oaks Road from Glass Road, following fresh tire tracks in the 
snow. They park twenty yards down the road from three cabins. A vehicle carrying two 
more officers pulls in behind them, parking directly in front of a cabin. The officers start 
to follow the tire tracks when shots hit their vehicles. The terrain and location mean there 
is no reception for hand-held radios. One officer runs back to his vehicle and broadcasts 
“shots fired” and “officer down.” One officer is mortally wounded and unconscious; a 
second is seriously wounded and unable to move. They both lie injured in the snow, directly 
in the line of fire that appears to be coming from one of the cabins. Initially the officers 
have difficulty determining which cabin the shots are coming from; again, they cannot hear 
the shots. One officer tries to move the vehicle shielding the injured officers in an effort to 
drag them out of the way, but instead leaves them directly exposed. More officers arrive 
and begin firing into the cabin, providing cover for the exposed officers. Two officers, at 
great risk, manage to approach the cabin and drag both injured officers to safety. A massive 
gunfight ensues for about ten minutes. The patrol rifles of thirty to forty officers now ring 
the cabin. Several officers are trapped and under fire behind a row of vehicles, finally 
rescued by a tactical tractor that arrives after forty minutes.105 
The “narrow, snow-lined mountain roads leading to the cabin are so congested with 
responding police vehicles” that the San Bernardino Sheriff’s tactical tractor must be 
unloaded at some distance from the scene, delaying its response.106 The Police Foundation 
later reports “officers pointing rifles down the mountain without knowing the cabin’s 
location, inadvertently at fellow law enforcement.”107 A helicopter from LAPD carrying a 
tactical team lands, without permission from or coordination with the command post, 
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dangerously close to the scene, endangering officers onboard and complicating the 
response on the ground.108 
One of the three roads up the mountain toward the scene is completely closed to all 
traffic, including police vehicles, but “police officers—including command staff from 
agencies miles away—drive around the checkpoint.”109 In another incident, the San 
Bernardino Sheriff’s Department command is forced to order detectives from an 
uninvolved police agency out of the crime scene area. The officers reported to the crime 
scene area based on orders from their own agency command, rather than from any mutual 
aid request.110 
Two hours later, San Bernardino deputies open a hole in the wall of the cabin with 
the tactical tractor. They broadcast several messages to Dorner. The only response is the 
deployment of green tactical smoke canisters by Dorner from inside the cabin, indicating 
he is still alive. The tactical team advises Dorner that they will fire “hot” pyrotechnic gas 
into the cabin if he does not surrender. Dorner does not respond.111  
At 4:09 p.m., the tactical team deploys the pyrotechnic gas. One canister lands 
outside the structure and begins to burn the wall. Dorner releases another green gas canister 
from inside the structure. The fire spreads along the outside walls.112 
Shortly thereafter, a single gunshot is heard from inside the cabin. The cabin 
becomes engulfed in fire. Large amounts of ammunition are heard exploding inside, 
making it too dangerous for the fire department to approach. 
Hours later, the fire is extinguished and a body is located in the basement. Using 
dental records, Dorner is officially identified on February 14, 2013. The cause of death is 
a self-inflicted gunshot wound to the head. The same gun that Dorner used to kill himself 
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is later tied to the murders of Keith Lawrence and Monica Quan.113 While the threat 
appears to involve only Christopher Dorner, the investigation goes on for several months, 
reviewing the incidents surrounding the manhunt.  
The Dorner incident began as an investigation into a double homicide by the Irvine 
Police Department—a process familiar to any police department, even with the unusual 
“hit” style of the murders. Once the manifesto was located, the case moved in a completely 
different direction, requiring a larger, more organized response, despite a series of rapid, 
novel, and violent events. While components of ICS were used in the command post and 
in the logistics behind the search for Dorner, much of the officers’ related training is never 
incorporated. It was as if ICS, in its current format and structure, was not conducive to 
resolving this event. As detailed in the next chapters, extreme examples of police self-
deployment may hamper the response, or, alternatively, help bring the case to an end. 
  
                                                 
113 Police Foundation, Police under Attack, 40. 
 
 36
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 37
IV. CASE STUDY NARRATIVE: 2013 BOSTON MARATHON 
BOMBINGS 
At the annual running of the Boston Marathon on April 15, 2013, two bombs 
exploded near the finish line, killing three and injuring over two hundred and fifty people. 
A massive investigation ensued, culminating in a firefight in nearby Watertown and an 
intense manhunt for Dzhokar Tsarnaev, ending with his capture four days later. This 
narrative is not a comprehensive portrayal of all events that occurred or all agencies that 
responded, but is narrowly focused on incidents of police self-deployment and how it 
affected response and the circumstances around the incidents. 
A. MONDAY, APRIL 15, 2013  
On Monday, April 15, 2013, at 2:49 p.m., during the 117th running of the Boston 
Marathon, a bomb explodes in proximity to the finish line in downtown Boston. Within 
seconds, a second bomb explodes a few hundred yards away. Three people are killed 
almost instantly, and over two hundred and sixty suffer injuries, including traumatic 
amputations and life-threatening wounds from flying glass and shrapnel.114 Because the 
marathon is a planned event with emergency responders on scene, response is quick. 
Despite concerns of further explosions, “triage and treatment start immediately at both 
explosion sites by nearby fire, police, EMS, medical personnel, and bystanders who rush 
to help the injured.”115 Officers even use cruisers to transport the injured once ambulances 
become overwhelmed.116 
By late afternoon, the situation is more organized. Police evacuate all 5,000 
remaining marathon runners from the course. Per ICS guidelines, agency and government 
leaders establish the nearby Westin Hotel as a unified command center. Explosive 
ordinance mutual aid teams are on scene, clearing suspicious packages and investigating. 
A twelve-block area is cordoned off for the investigation, with a total of sixty-one 
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suspicious packages investigated in the immediate aftermath of the bombings. At 
4:47 p.m., the first news conference is held. A second one follows shortly after 5:00 p.m. 
Then, at the third press conference at 6:30 p.m., the incident is publicly identified as a 
terrorist attack; the FBI is announced as the lead investigative agency.117 
B. TUESDAY, APRIL 16, AND WEDNESDAY, APRIL 17, 2013 
Over the course of several press conferences, the FBI requests information from the 
public, such as cell phone photographs, to assist in the investigation. Based on early 
evidence, the FBI is “looking for individuals who may have been carrying black, heavy 
bags or backpacks that may have contained pressure-cooker type devices.”118 Investigators 
begin the arduous task of sifting through the massive amount of received data. 
A presidential emergency declaration is issued. Mutual aid resources and the 
Massachusetts Army National Guard continue to assist the Boston Police Department and 
the transit police, hospitals, and key infrastructure with increased security.119 
C. THURSDAY, APRIL 18, 2013 
At 11:00 a.m., a prayer service is held at the Cathedral of the Holy Cross in Boston 
with President Obama and other local and federal dignitaries in attendance, adding to the 
already stressed security responsibilities in the area. Afterward, both the President and First 
Lady visit the injured at different area hospitals. They depart Boston at 4:00 p.m. Shortly 
after, the FBI releases photographs of two suspects, “White Hat” and “Black Hat,” at a 
press conference and appeals to the public for help identifying and locating them.120 
At 10:28 p.m., an armed robbery is reported at a convenience store in Cambridge. 
A few minutes later, after several unsuccessful attempts to reach Massachusetts Institute 
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of Technology (MIT) Officer Sean Collier by radio regarding calls for shots fired in the 
area, Collier is found fatally shot in his cruiser parked on the MIT campus in proximity to 
the armed robbery location. Cambridge officers responding to the armed robbery are 
rerouted to MIT. The two incidents are initially thought to be related. Notification of the 
shooting is broadcast over the Boston Area Police Emergency Radio Network (BAPERN), 
a regional radio channel monitored by several area police agencies. On-duty officers from 
law enforcement agencies with jurisdiction and within protocol respond to assist with the 
investigation.121  
D. FRIDAY, APRIL 19, 2013 
At 12:19 a.m., the Cambridge Police Department responds to a gas station where 
the victim of a carjacking reportedly escaped his captors. The victim tells police that his 
vehicle was carjacked in the Allston section of Boston about an hour before, but that the 
vehicle has anti-theft GPS tracking. Cambridge PD activate the GPS and issue a BOLO for 
the black Mercedes SUV and the carjackers, noting that the carjackers are armed; a 
broadcast is made over BAPERN as well.122 Critically, due to a language barrier, 
investigators do not learn until several minutes into the victim’s interview that the 
carjackers stated that they are the Boston Marathon bombers, and confessed to killing 
Officer Collier. The original BOLO does not include this information. Twenty minutes 
later, the GPS tracking device in the Mercedes alerts officers to 81 Dexter Avenue in 
Watertown, five miles from MIT. Watertown dispatch notifies its officers. An officer in a 
marked cruiser responds to Dexter Avenue and locates the Mercedes, inadvertently making 
eye contact with the operator as he radios to dispatch. The Mercedes and a Honda sedan 
following closely behind turn left onto Laurel Street. The operator of the Mercedes 
suddenly stops and exits the vehicle, walking toward the police cruiser while firing a gun. 
A police supervisor arrives on scene, seconds behind the first officer, and narrowly misses 
being shot as rounds hit his windshield. A second male exits the Honda, tossing homemade 
improvised explosive devices (IEDs) at the officers, some of which explode. Under fire, 
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one officer is able to radio “shots fired” but is unable to access his patrol rifle before 
abandoning the cruiser. Watertown dispatch radios for assistance from other police 
agencies over BAPERN.123 
A fierce firefight involving gunfire and exploding IEDs ensues as officers from 
Boston, Cambridge, Massachusetts Bay Transit Authority (MBTA), the Massachusetts 
State Police, and nearby communities respond. One suspect is wounded. As officers move 
to take him into custody, the second suspect, now driving the Mercedes, drives toward the 
officers; the officers dive out of the way. The second suspect continues, running over and 
dragging the wounded suspect several feet before fleeing the scene in a barrage of gunfire. 
Due to the gridlock of police vehicles parked on the neighborhood streets, officers are 
unable to immediately pursue the Mercedes. The Mercedes is later discovered, abandoned, 
a few blocks away.124  
During the melee, MBTA Transit Officer Richard Donahue is shot and critically 
injured. Watertown dispatchers have ambulances pre-staged for response nearby; however, 
the gridlock of parked police vehicles makes it difficult for the ambulance to respond. 
Finally, a Watertown police officer familiar with the area drives the ambulance to the 
hospital, enabling paramedics, assisted by a trained state police officer, to treat Officer 
Donahue en route. That transport and the following actions of emergency room personnel 
are credited with saving his life. After-action reports indicate that this was a “friendly-fire” 
incident, meaning that Officer Donahue was shot by a fellow responding police officer.125 
Meanwhile, an unmarked black state police pickup truck responding to the shootout 
is erroneously reported as stolen. An officer at the scene spots the pickup a few blocks 
away and shoots at it with a patrol rifle, hitting it multiple times. The plainclothes Boston 
police officer and Massachusetts state trooper, members of a gang task force, emerge 
uninjured.126  
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The wounded suspect is transported to the hospital and pronounced dead. He is 
identified from fingerprints as Tamerlan Tsarnaev. The suspect at large is then identified 
as his younger brother, Dzhokar Tsarnaev. “White Hat” and “Black Hat” become Dzhokar 
and Tamerlan Tsarnaev, the Boston Marathon bombers. 
By 1:00 a.m., the scene is secure and the hundreds of officers now present organize 
into teams to search for the remaining suspect. Unexploded bombs in the street complicate 
the comprehensive grid search of the neighborhood. Explosive ordinance technicians 
render the unexploded IEDs and crime scene area safe and the unsuccessful search for 
Tsarnaev is complete by 6:00 a.m, yet police officers from all over continue to arrive. In 
an attempt to organize the officers, the nearby Arsenal Mall becomes a staging area and 
command post location. By early morning, over 1,000 officers are staged at the mall. The 
Massachusetts Army National Guard sends twenty-one armored vehicles and one hundred 
and twenty armed military police to assist as part of a mutual aid request.127 
At 5:45 a.m., during a press conference with police chiefs and government officials, 
Massachusetts Governor Deval Patrick announces that all transit system service is 
suspended. He orders residents in six nearby communities to shelter in place, and remain 
indoors. He also requests that local businesses close and requires state employees who live 
and/or work in those communities to stay home.128  
At 6:00 a.m., the Watertown Police Department broadcasts one of two radio 
requests for all responding officers to report to the Arsenal Mall staging area. Over the 
course of the day, 2,500 officers from one hundred and sixteen federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies arrive at the staging area.129 Requests for assistance go out to 
specific departments and units from the command post. Still, officers arrive uninvited—
some do not have department authorization to be there, and many have no jurisdictional 
authority. As news of the Dexter and Laurel Street incident and escape spread, more 
officers self-deploy. Other officers never report to the command post. At the command 
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post itself, there are no ICS structures in place to handle the massive influx—relief 
supplies, support, and command are inadequate. There are few orientation sessions, updates 
on situational awareness, or general guidance from incident command. While most officers 
do not deploy into the field from the staging area on their own, there are many instances of 
officers reacting to anecdotal information or radio calls.130 
A massive, systematic, door-to-door search for the suspect ensues. Law 
enforcement and SWAT personnel from the FBI, Massachusetts Army National Guard, 
Boston Police Department, Cambridge, Massachusetts State Police, MBTA, and two 
regional law enforcement teams—all accompanied by Watertown police officers—form 
teams and search a twenty-street grid area throughout the day. Staff at the command post 
orchestrate the searches.131 
At 8:15 a.m., authorities suspend all taxi service in Boston after reports emerge of 
a suspicious person carrying a package boarding an Amtrak train going south. Located in 
Connecticut, the Amtrak train is stopped, searched, and cleared at 9:00 a.m.132 
Despite the absence of new leads, multiple press conferences occur during the day 
to update the public. At the Arsenal Mall command post, no logistics chief is appointed to 
organize incoming personnel. As time goes on, arriving officers do not incorporate into 
teams or receive assignments. Agency commanders and supervisors concentrate 
exclusively on command of their own personnel, without support from incident command. 
Regardless, some officers refuse to acknowledge orders from authorities outside their own 
agencies. With no formal method for handling assignments, some officers use the radio 
system, media reports, or professional contacts with colleagues in the affected departments 
to self-deploy to the area.133 
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At a press conference shortly after 6:00 p.m., authorities announce the lifting of the 
shelter-in-place order after completion of the door-to-door search. Dzhokar Tsarnaev 
remains at large.  
At 6:42 p.m., Watertown PD receives a 911 call from a resident at 67 Franklin 
Street—just outside the search perimeter. He reports that a bleeding man is hiding on his 
boat, in his yard. The boat is shrink-wrapped with a winterized tarp. The information is 
broadcast over the radio—police units and multiple tactical teams race to the densely 
populated neighborhood. Within minutes, over one hundred officers gather around the 
home.134 
While tactical command is quickly established, command and control of the 
officers around the perimeter is haphazard. At 6:45 p.m., the suspect, using what turns out 
to be a fishing gaff, attempts to lift the cover off the boat. An officer, without authorization, 
opens fire. Other officers, under the assumption that the initial shot was fired at them by 
the suspect, start a barrage of contagious shooting that goes on for several seconds despite 
repeated cease-fire orders from the scene commander. Over two hundred rounds strike the 
boat.135  
An hour goes by without response from the person in the boat. A tactical team 
deploys flash bang ammunition. Subsequent infrared images taken by a state police 
helicopter show the individual moving, apparently alive. The state police deploy a Bearcat 
armored vehicle with a remote arm that opens the winterized tarp covering the boat, 
exposing Tsarnaev. The FBI hostage response team attempts communication. At 8:41p.m., 
Dzhokar Tsarnaev voluntarily emerges from the boat and is taken into custody. He is 
transported to the hospital with significant injuries.136 He is unarmed. 
Two bombs exploded at the finish line of the 117th Boston Marathon in 2013. The 
bombings were unexpected but not surprising. Planning for the Boston Marathon is 
ongoing, and scenarios, including terrorist events, are discussed and annually practiced 
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with tabletop and active drills. All first responders are trained in ICS and work assignments 
specific to the marathon. Nevertheless, there are incidents of both good and bad police self-




V. CASE STUDY FINDINGS: SELF-DEPLOYMENT AND ICS 
This chapter examines specific instances of police self-deployment in the 
Christopher Dorner Manhunt and the Boston Marathon bombings as they relate to ICS. 
Each case is unpacked independently. Incidents of police self-deployment are assessed for 
setting, incident outcome, and ICS implementation. The conclusion explores similarities 
and differences between the cases to define police self-deployment and its relevance to 
ICS. 
A. POLICE SELF-DEPLOYMENT IN THE CHRISTOPHER DORNER 
MANHUNT 
1. The Setting 
The Dorner manhunt begins as an investigation into a double homicide by the Irvine 
Police Department. Although the case has some unusual factors—evidence of a silencer on 
the weapon and the ambush, or “hit,” style of the murder—the event fits into normal police 
procedures, firmly under the jurisdiction and control of Irvine PD. Then, events move fast 
and unpredictably. In the next thirty hours, between the detection of his online manifesto 
calling for war on LAPD and the discovery of his burning truck in Big Bear, Christopher 
Dorner assaults and ties up an 81-year-old man in a failed attempt to hijack his boat in 
Point Loma, ambushes and injures LAPD officers in Corona, and murders Officer Michael 
Crain while grievously injuring another officer in Riverside. LAPD launches an 
unprecedented security detail, sending officers to over seventy locations throughout 
southern California. In Torrance, officers on an LAPD detail mistakenly shoot and injure 
two women delivering newspapers. Adding to the confusion is the random discovery of 
Dorner’s identification on the side of a road in San Diego. The indiscriminate attacks on 
police officers and frenetic pace of events clearly illustrate Dorner’s intent. It is reasonable 
to assume that all police officers on or off duty in the southern California area are on 





2. Police Self-deployment Incidents 
a. The Burning Truck in Big Bear 
According to the Police Foundation, the mass convergence of officers in Big Bear 
after the discovery of Dorner’s burning truck represents the first incidence of police self-
deployment.137 In line with ICS requirements, the San Bernardino County Sheriff’s 
Department (SBCSD) quickly establishes a command post nearby in a golf course 
clubhouse—unknowingly in sight of the condominium where Dorner is hiding—and an 
operational command in San Bernardino. Hundreds of officers, most without appropriate 
gear or knowledge of the region, rush to the area from all over southern California.138 Some 
organize into teams under the command of the SBCSD, but reports suggest numerous 
officers self-organize into small units, performing searches and other activities without 
direction from incident command.139 Self-deployed officers who are familiar with the area 
use their knowledge to forecast routes of escape and potential hiding locations. According 
to the Police Foundation report, the SBCSD did not request these officers or activate mutual 
aid. Operating under ICS procedures, the command post is unable to absorb the glut of 
officers through active assignment, outright refusal, or delegation to standby status.  
b. Standoff at the Cabin 
The discovery of Dorner’s burning truck results in the self-deployment of hundreds 
of police officers to Big Bear. Scene commanders work for days to disperse those officers. 
Nevertheless, five days later, the same self-deployment scenario occurs when police rush 
to the cabin where Dorner is cornered.  
After he is discovered by the owners of the condominium, Dorner continues his 
violent rampage. He holds the owners hostage before gagging and tying them up and 
fleeing in their vehicle, which he crashes in the snow. Dorner then carjacks another man at 
gunpoint, using his pickup to flee to the cabin. Once discovered at the cabin, he kills 
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SBCSD Detective Jeremiah MacKay and seriously injures Deputy Alex Collins in an 
intense gun battle. Under heavy gunfire, officers manage to contain him in the cabin. While 
no one can be sure what Dorner will do next, the threat to public safety is contained for the 
first time in the investigation. Nevertheless, the self-deployment scenario at the cabin 
quickly mirrors the scene at the burning pickup truck. Rogue teams of police officers evade 
roadblocks set up by colleagues. Officers must unload a tactical tractor—later used to 
safely move officers and punch holes in the cabin—at some distance from the scene 
because emergency vehicles block the roads. Officers unknowingly point weapons at one 
another. An LAPD helicopter, without permission from scene commanders, lands too close 
to the active crime scene, forcing the SBCSD to alter critical ongoing operations for officer 
safety.140 
The Police Foundation report notes that three agencies’ officers did not self-deploy 
to the cabin standoff. Irvine PD detectives in Big Bear Lake investigating leads in the 
double murder are ordered to remain behind to interview the couple from the condominium 
attack. California Highway Patrol officers establish a perimeter and shut down vehicular 
access to the area. Commanders at Corona PD promulgate orders prohibiting self-
deployment for the duration of the Dorner investigation.141 While these actions are  
professionally responsible, they are in response to what had happened at the burning truck, 
not due to the outright ICS prohibition on police self-deployment. 
3. Command, Control, and ICS 
The Dorner case presents an extraordinary amount of sudden and novel events, each 
one independently qualifying as an incident subject to the structures of ICS. First, Irvine 
PD responds to the double homicide, an unusual event for the city but not out of the norm 
for police response. To coordinate the department-wide response, Irvine PD establishes an 
operation center. Discovery of Dorner’s manifesto prompts the invitation of LAPD to the 
center. Meanwhile, LAPD opens its own operations center to staff the 24/7 protective 
details. The shootings in Corona and Riverside trigger the opening of a command center 
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by Riverside PD to coordinate the apprehension of Dorner. When the smoldering truck is 
discovered in Big Bear, the SBCSD opens an incident command post nearby to oversee the 
search, and additionally opens a department operations center in San Bernardino. Despite 
the implementation of ICS at the agency level, the chiefs do not establish a unified 
command that strategically organizes the investigations or the various searches for Dorner, 
and fails to coordinate information sharing. According to the Police Foundation report, the 
lack of a unified command is most clearly embodied in a dispute over evidentiary and 
investigative control of the burned-out truck. Here, each investigating agency argues for 
jurisdiction: 
Irvine Police expressed that they had acquired a search warrant before the 
tragic shootings in Corona and Riverside. The warrant would help serve as 
a legal basis for obtaining and processing evidence in Orange County. 
Riverside investigators explained that the shootings in Corona and 
Riverside presented a direct nexus between the truck and the murder of a 
police officer and the attempted murder of three others. They further 
asserted that obtaining a warrant in Riverside County would not be difficult 
and the truck should remain in San Bernardino.142 
The Police Foundation notes specifically that, although the SBCSD facilitates the 
departments’ discussions, the launch of a unified command center—an integral piece of 
ICS—does not occur.143  
In one attempt to coordinate the rapidly expanding investigation after the Big Bear 
incident, agency chiefs establish a multiagency coordination center (MAC) at the Joint 
Regional Intelligence Center in Norwalk, California, one hundred miles from the Big Bear 
search area. Managed by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department, the Joint Regional 
Intelligence Center conventionally acts as a regional fusion center for criminal drug and 
terrorism intelligence. As a neutral entity for the Dorner manhunt, the primary function of 
the MAC is to coordinate assets and organize investigative information from all the 
involved agencies; however, there is some confusion over whether the MAC is supposed 
to provide unified command. By definition, the multiagency coordination system under 
                                                 




NIMS provides the “architecture to support coordination for incident prioritization, critical 
resource allocation, communications systems integration and information 
coordination.”144 While the MAC provides strategic support for the investigation, it is not 
designed to oversee the logistics or assignment of tactical and front-line responders.  
The Police Foundation’s interviews of officers who worked with the Dorner MAC 
yielded mixed reviews. Overall, the MAC improved collaboration, but not all involved 
agencies participated equally. Due to the distance from the active scene and the small size 
of some departments, assigning strategic staff—those empowered to make leadership 
decisions—proved challenging. Investigators “appreciated open interaction” but also 
found the intelligence somewhat inaccurate and difficult to use as evidence.145 
California has a strong network of mutual aid agreements that depend on the 
integration of ICS. Described by the California Governor’s Office of Emergency 
Management as “an extension of the concept of neighbor helping neighbor,” mutual aid in 
California provides an expanding process for requesting and receiving outside law 
enforcement or other agency assistance to one in need.146 California is divided into seven 
mutual aid regions; agencies in need request assistance first from their local county, then 
the mutual-aid region, and, lastly, the outside region. The police agencies involved in the 
Dorner case—the California Highway Patrol, Corona PD, Irvine PD, LAPD, National City 
PD, Riverside PD, SBCSD, San Bernardino PD, and Torrance PD—spanned five counties 
and two mutual aid regions. At the cabin, the SBCSD did not request mutual aid. Despite 
the lack of request, officers self-deployed from many of the involved agencies. 
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Remarkably, the two documents that manage law enforcement mutual aid for the state of 
California do not mention self-deployment at all.147  
Through the well-established mutual aid system, California agencies have a strong 
incentive to use ICS; nonetheless, ICS implementation in the Dorner manhunt was 
problematic, especially at the unified command level. While most departments successfully 
established their own operations and/or investigative centers, coordination at the macro 
level never coalesced, perhaps due to the pace of events. Without coordination among all 
the top levels of command, police self-deployment continued unchecked.  
B. POLICE SELF-DEPLOYMENT IN THE BOSTON MARATHON 
BOMBINGS 
1. The Setting 
The Boston Marathon bombings begin as a response to violence at a planned event; 
though outside the confines of normal police response, it is not an unexpected scenario. 
When two bombs explode within seconds of each other on April 15, 2013, at the finish line 
of the marathon, three people are killed and hundreds suffer injuries, many life-threatening. 
The marathon is a prestigious event, with participation from elite runners. The course, 
location, and traditions are internationally renowned. The same holds true for security 
preparations, with involvement from the state, the city of Boston, the seven communities 
along the route, federal agencies, and international organizations. Annual preparations 
based on after-action reviews of previous marathons include adjustments to medical 
services, security procedures, and other issues. These preparations include drills employing 
terrorist scenarios. 
On April 15, 2013, a massive emergency operations plan overseeing the safety, 
health, security, and enjoyment of runners and spectators along the route is fully integrated 
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and functioning. When the bombings occur, ICS processes already in place are activated 
and move quickly into a comprehensive terrorism investigation overseen by the FBI. 
Nonetheless, the region is understandably on edge. A terrorist event has occurred, at an 
event under heavy security and covered by the worldwide media. The public, from 
international groups to local citizens, put police under intense pressure to identify and 
capture the perpetrators. 
A few days later, the intensity and speed of events tragically illustrate the suspects’ 
desperation. The FBI broadcasts two photos of suspects, “White Hat” and “Black Hat,” 
after a nationally broadcast memorial service for the victims. Only a few hours later, MIT 
Officer Sean Collier is murdered while seated in his cruiser. Then, a victim reports being 
carjacked by two men who tell him they are the marathon bombers and are heading to New 
York. The stolen vehicle, equipped with GPS, alerts police to Dexter and Laurel Streets in 
Watertown, where a violent gun battle involving detonating bombs breaks out between 
police and the two perpetrators. An officer is almost killed by friendly fire; a cruiser is shot 
up by police. At the end, Dzhokar Tsarnaev runs over his brother and flees on foot into a 
quiet city neighborhood. As dawn breaks on Friday, residents of Boston wake up to news 
that the marathon bomber is still on the loose and probably nearby. The police come under 
more pressure as the city of Boston and several surrounding towns are virtually shut down 
and a door-to-door search of a twenty-block area by SWAT teams begins. Media reports 
show heavily armed officers entering homes and Bearcat tactical vehicles in the streets. 
The Arsenal Mall command post is overwhelmed by responders. Journalists Scott Helman 
and Jenna Russell describe the feelings that day of both citizens and first responders: “The 
whole day was like one big pregnant moment and no one knew how it would end.”148 The 
day seems to end with a press conference announcing that a careful search is unproductive. 
Dzhokar Tsarnaev remains on the loose. 
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2. Police Self-deployment Incidents 
a. The Finish Line 
Leonard et al. and the commonwealth of Massachusetts project management team 
identify the first incident of police self-deployment at the finish line immediately after the 
bombs explode. In the rush to treat the injured, officers transport victims to the hospital 
using their cruisers. Leonard et al. cite this police response as a positive use of self-
deployment.149 Despite a substantial physical response to the area and a lack of clear initial 
command, independent officers self-organize into teams to care for the injured, secure the 
scene, and evacuate the crowds.  
b. Dexter and Laurel Streets Firefight 
The firefight at Dexter and Laurel Streets in Watertown on Thursday night is an 
example of positive and negative police self-deployment. The intensity of the setting plays 
an important part in the number of officers that responded.  
On Thursday morning, President Obama and First Lady Michelle Obama attend a 
nationally broadcast memorial service and visit hospitalized victims. On Thursday 
afternoon, the FBI releases photographs of “White Hat” and “Black Hat” as persons of 
interest. The photographs are culled from thousands of images, many contributed by 
marathon participants and spectators. The FBI requests the public’s help in identifying the 
two men. A few hours later, police discover MIT Officer Collier shot dead in his cruiser. 
An armed robbery occurs in Cambridge; then, a call for a carjacking comes in a few miles 
away. The victim tells officers that the stolen vehicle has GPS tracking. The GPS alerts to 
a location at Dexter and Laurel Streets in Watertown. Due to a language barrier, the victim 
is initially unable to communicate to officers that the two men who attacked him confessed 
to the Boston Marathon bombings and murder of Officer Collier. That information is 
broadcast to the police as a fierce gun battle with exploding IEDs ensues between the 
Tsarnaevs and police. Patrols and investigative units in the area, as well as others listening 
to the regional BAPERN channel, hear Watertown dispatch call for assistance, including 
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the chilling words; “shots fired.” Officers respond to Dexter and Laurel Streets from 
several different police departments—most with appropriate jurisdiction, immediate ability 
to assist, and apparent authorization from their command—in keeping with the definition 
of self-initiated policing, rather than self-deployment.  
The mass response is not without problems. MBTA Transit Officer Richard 
Donahue is critically injured, hit by friendly fire. An officer mistakenly identifies an 
unmarked state police vehicle as stolen and fires at it, striking it several times.150 
Responders randomly park cruisers, leaving a maze of abandoned vehicles, which prevent 
both immediate pursuit of the fleeing suspect and unrestricted passage of the ambulance 
carrying Officer Donahue.151 Nevertheless, neither Leonard et al. nor the Massachusetts 
project management group conclusively determine if police self-deployment was a causal 
factor or, alternatively, those issues occurred spontaneously. The mass presence magnified 
the issues with weapons discipline and impassable streets, but the actual cause of the 
problems remains less certain.  
One positive aspect of having so many officers on scene is the ability to organize 
hasty search teams at the conclusion of the firefight. These teams fanned out in an 
unsuccessful effort, organized by commanders on scene, to locate the escaped suspect. 
Chapter II discusses defining self-deployment based on the results of the event; it is 
interesting to contemplate whether self-deployment would be a positive aspect of the 
response if Dzhokar Tsarnaev had been located by the hasty search teams. 
c. Watertown: Arsenal Mall Command Post and Search 
On Friday, more than 2,500 officers from 116 agencies respond to Watertown.152 
At the Arsenal Mall command post, hundreds of requested officers remain in the staging 
area waiting for an assignment, but are never deployed. While the tactical search teams are 
organized and coordinated by incident command, other responding officers remain in 
staging, unassigned. There are several reported incidents, all of which turn out to be false 
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alarms. Watertown dispatch reports receiving twenty-eight 911 calls on Thursday—a 
routine day—and five hundred and sixty-six calls that Friday. Self-deployed officers—
without request, department authorization, or jurisdictional authority—arrive, adding to the 
crowd. Theoretically, at a command post operating under ICS guidelines, the logistics 
section is responsible for providing support to the incident and responders. No logistics 
section is established at the Arsenal Mall. Arriving officers, self-deployed or otherwise, are 
not oriented, processed within ICS structures, or given specific assignments. With little 
oversight or support, self-deployed officers present at the command post, and others who 
never report in, “chase calls” based on anecdotal information, professional contacts, and 
overheard radio calls.153  
d. The Boat: Final Standoff 
Both Leonard et al. and the Massachusetts project management team recognize 
police self-deployment as a problem at the final standoff. In this instance, the circumstances 
surrounding that scene again play a significant role in the police response. After a press 
conference that lifts the day-long shelter-in-place order, a local resident just outside the 
search area discovers the suspect in a winterized boat in his yard. That information is 
broadcast over the radio. While the command post is “standing down,” or gradually 
shutting down, discharged officers still have radio communication and are leaving wearing 
uniforms and in fully equipped cruisers. Many have waited in frustration for an assignment 
all day. Within minutes, hundreds of these officers respond to the neighborhood, leaving 
cruisers parked haphazardly in the streets. Tactical teams are assigned to the inner 
perimeter under the jurisdiction of the FBI. Media images of the scene show uniformed 
and plainclothes officers from multiple law enforcement agencies crowding the streets that 
surround the home. Self-deployed activity and the desire to capture Tsarnaev contributes 
to confusion and chaos in the standoff, including the contagious shooting at the boat and 
initial uncertainty about who commands the perimeter.154 Despite the fact that officers 
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have Tsarnaev pinned in the boat, plenty of on-scene assistance, and clear avenues to 
request additional help, the scene remains overcrowded.  
3. Command, Control, and ICS 
The Boston Marathon bombings, while unexpected, happened during an annual 
event for which organizers plan and prepare. Several factors in the preparations for the 
2013 marathon prevented more catastrophic consequences: increased medical capabilities 
after a surge in heat emergencies the year before, explosive ordinance technicians from 
several states staged or on scene, and ongoing chemical/biological/radioactive/nuclear 
(CBRNE) device detection. ICS is in place and active at both local and macro command 
levels. A MAC is already operational, monitoring marathon activities from the 
Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency (MEMA) bunker in Framingham. In 
Massachusetts, the MEMA bunker normally operates a MAC for extreme weather disasters 
as well as planned events like the marathon; this ensures that those present are familiar 
with each other and -incident protocol. On April 13, 2013, eighty representatives from law 
enforcement, fire, and EMS agencies; non-government agencies; state emergency 
management; and federal agencies are stationed at the MAC, providing a strong base to 
establish and maintain ICS as the event chronology unfolds.155 Decades of cooperative 
efforts and planning among the agencies, governments, and businesses involved in the 
Boston Marathon mean that a unified command is already at work. Nevertheless, law 
enforcement still self-deploys multiple times: at the finish line, the Dexter and Laurel 
Streets firefight, the Arsenal Mall command post, and the final standoff in Watertown.  
Leonard et al. use the terms “fixed” and “no notice” to separate the two types of 
events that occurred in Boston. Self-deployment occurred during both event types in 
Boston. Fixed events are conducive to the structures and processes of ICS. The marathon 
and the bombing itself were fixed events; ICS structures are in place to deal with the 
emergency and the events as they evolve.156 Within minutes of the bombing, agency 
leaders set up unified command at a nearby hotel. Despite the ferocity of the event, the 
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initial structures to contain the damage and begin recovery at the strategic level were 
operational within minutes. The preparation and strategic coordination manifested most 
obviously in three press conferences that transpired the afternoon of the bombing. In spite 
of an active and engaged ICS, there was still police self-deployment. But this was positive 
self-deployment; some officers provided medical care and rescue, others self-organized to 
secure the crime scene and render it safe, and others evacuated runners from the course.  
Leonard et al. describe the murder of Officer Collier, the firefight, and subsequent 
manhunt as “no-notice” events;  
As these cascading events unfolded, command had to be organically 
assembled while events were ongoing and continuing to evolve. By contrast 
with Monday’s events, the rapidly-assembling responders in Watertown 
had only the doctrine of incident management and their experience and 
personal relationships with one another to build upon.157 
Leonard et al. suggest that no-notice events are resistant to the processes of ICS. 
Nevertheless, at the firefight, arriving commanders assigned groups of officers to conduct 
a preliminary search for the surviving suspect, after the initial chaos. Officer Collier’s 
murder is also considered a no-notice event, although the response and investigative 
protocols are part of police routine.  
According to Leonard et al. and the Massachusetts project management team, the 
ICS failure point in Boston occurred at the micro or tactical command level. This is also 
the level at which police self-deployment can most easily be controlled through immediate 
supervisory oversight. The Massachusetts project management team cites uncertainty over 
which agency was in charge of the Arsenal Mall command post. In addition, without a 
logistics section to orient and assign incoming officers, agencies resorted to commanding 
their own people and resisted authority from outside agencies.158 While Boston provides a 
successful example of ICS unified command, police self-deployment still occurred, 
especially at the Arsenal Mall command post. 
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C. COMPARING AND CONTRASTING POLICE SELF-DEPLOYMENT IN 
DORNER AND BOSTON 
Police self-deployment was a universal issue at both events, and there are several 
incidents that bear similarities worth discussion. At the Boston Marathon and during the 
searches for Dorner when ICS was established, officers self-deployed, disobeying direct 
orders. Abandoned police vehicles blocking traffic represent the occurrence of police self-
deployment in both events. Despite the best efforts of law enforcement, both Christopher 
Dorner and Dzhokar Tsarnaev were located by civilians. Violent attacks on law 
enforcement officers in both events led to increased self-deployment and apparent 
command reluctance to enforce prohibition of self-deployment. 
1. Police Self-deployment Occurred at Fixed Events 
Both Dorner and Boston were, at some point, established, fixed events. In 
California, the search set up after Dorner’s burning truck was found in Big Bear is an 
example of a fixed event, controlled under the auspices of ICS. Self-deployment there may 
have contributed to further chaos and did not result in the suspect’s capture. The Boston 
Marathon bombings occurred at a fixed event under the full implementation of ICS. 
Nonetheless, police self-deployed at the Boston Marathon finish line minutes before 
command and control was implemented. That self-deployment was recognized for 
ingenuity and may have saved lives.  
2. Police Self-deployment Occurred at the Searches 
The Dorner manhunt presented a challenging search environment in the Big Bear 
area, both after location of the pickup truck and after Dorner was located in the 
condominium. Officers who were assigned to search needed preparations for a rural, snowy 
wilderness with limited communication. Outdoor skills, knowledge of the area, and proper 
gear were necessary for both Dorner searches; nonetheless, unprepared officers self-
deployed and self-organized into search parties that did not report into ICS. In Boston, the 
Arsenal Mall command post oversaw house-by-house searches performed by heavily 
armed tactical teams in an urban residential neighborhood. Nevertheless, police self-
deployed en masse to the search locations. At the Arsenal Mall, some self-deployed officers 
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arrived without authorization and others never reported in, following radio calls or 
exploiting local contacts for information, creating their own assignments. In both Dorner 
and Boston, the presence of so many officers distracted commanders in charge of the 
searches. 
3. Abandoned Vehicles Caused Traffic Problems 
Abandoned police vehicles clogging roadways are used as markers to identify 
police self-deployment. In California, congestion caused by abandoned vehicles along the 
roads leading to the cabin at the final standoff delayed a tactical tractor later used to extract 
officers trapped by gunfire and safely approach the cabin. In Boston, police vehicles 
abandoned haphazardly in and along the streets by officers responding to the Dexter and 
Laurel Streets firefight resulted in police failure to pursue a fleeing suspect and, critically, 
delayed ambulance transportation of Officer Dick Donahue, critically wounded by friendly 
fire. 
4. Perpetrators Were Located Inadvertently by Citizens 
Civilians, not the police, located Christopher Dorner and Dzhokar Tsarnaev. 
Despite a highly organized cabin-by-cabin search and unauthorized searches of the area 
conducted by self-deployed officers, the owners of a condominium inadvertently located 
Dorner and were immediately assaulted. In Boston, at the conclusion of a day-long, door-
to-door search by highly skilled tactical teams, Dzhokar Tsarnaev was located by a resident 
who checked on his winterized boat. Both events triggered massive self-deployment by 
police. Dorner and the Tsarnaevs’ behavior forced and even led police response. Yet self-
deployment also added to the chaos. Those in charge of the command posts were never 
entirely sure where self-deployed officers were or what they were doing, which caused 




5. Police Self-deployment Was Precipitated by Violent Attacks on Police 
Officers 
The Dorner case was about a man bent on extracting revenge upon the police by 
targeting officers and their families. When the burning truck was located in Big Bear, 
officers self-deployed in an extreme response to capture Dorner. In Boston, events became 
personal for police after the murder of MIT Officer Collier. Once the search for Tsarnaev 
narrowed to Watertown, police self-deployed to the area to join in the search for and 
capture of a killer. In both cases, officers ignored ICS command and control at the scenes. 
Police self-deployment in California and Boston happened under similar 
circumstances, despite full implementation of ICS, especially when the criminal acts 
personally affected police. Traffic congestion, long considered a hallmark of police self-
deployment, caused problems at both events. ICS’s prohibition of self-deployment failed 
to prevent the phenomenon as it occurred. The police, from command staff to front-line 
officers, repeatedly self-deployed at both incidents. The next chapter examines police self-
deployment incidents at the Dorner manhunt and Boston through the lens of wicked 
problems. This viewpoint encourages commanders to see the positive and negative aspects 
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VI. CASE STUDY FINDINGS: SELF-DEPLOYMENT AND
WICKED PROBLEMS 
In the 1970s, Horst Rittel and Melvin Webber defined wicked problems as those 
“that cannot be solved by scientific methods, only tamed.”159 They identified ten 
characteristics (see Table 1 in Chapter I). John Camillus clarified that “these characteristics 
are not a set of tests that mechanically determine wickedness; rather, they provide insights 
that help one judge whether a problem is wicked.”160 Notably, a wicked problem does not 
have to meet every characteristic. Churchman and Wexler expanded on the morality of 
wicked problems, aligning them more closely with the realm of public policy and 
government. This chapter explores how defining police self-deployment as a wicked 
problem changes individual, department, and ICS response. Using Tables 1 and 3 as an 
analysis tool, this chapter matches each characteristic and the overall moral responsibilities 
to instances of police self-deployment in the Dorner manhunt and Boston Marathon 
bombings. 
A. WICKED PROBLEM CHARACTERISTICS IN CASE STUDIES 
(1) “There is no definitive formulation of a wicked problem.”161  
Police self-deployment, as illustrated in the previous chapters, resists definition. 
Typically, the narrative of an event provides descriptions of behaviors that are then defined 
as police self-deployment. No definitive principles exist. Those terms used to define self-
deployment are often used to define self-initiated policing. Without a concrete definition, 
recommendations for improvements in after-action reports are ambiguous, restricted to 
suggestions for more ICS training or enhanced cooperation between agencies. Since many 
of the events that involve police self-deployment are black swan events, these 
recommendations are not fully implemented, leading to self-deployment at the next event 
and continuing the cycle. This cycle may even occur within an event. During the Dorner 
159 Rittel and Webber, “Dilemmas in a General Theory,” 160. 
160 Camillus, Wicked Strategies, 2. 
161 Rittel and Webber, 161. 
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manhunt, self-deployment occurred when the smoldering pickup truck was found in Big 
Bear; only five days later, the same scenario recurred when Dorner was surrounded at the 
cabin.  
(2) “Wicked problems have no stopping rule.”162 
Outside critical events such as the Dorner manhunt and Boston—black swan 
events—police self-deployment is rarely identified as a problem. Neither a definitive 
definition nor specific criteria to eliminate self-deployment exist. Proof of a remaining 
problem manifests in after-action reports for the next critical event. For example, at the 
Inland Regional Center Shooting in San Bernardino in December 2015, less than three 
years after the Dorner manhunt, the same significant issues attributed to police self-
deployment involving many of the same agencies that responded to Dorner recurred: traffic 
congestion, poor weapons discipline, and loss of command and control.163 
(3) “Solutions to wicked problems are not true or false, but bad or good.”164 
The confusion that surrounds the definition of police self-deployment also frames 
the solutions. Police self-deployment was good when lives were saved in Boston at the 
finish line after the bombs exploded. At the Dexter and Laurel Streets firefight, self-
deployment was bad when an officer was critically wounded by friendly fire. Seemingly, 
the results of the incident determine whether police self-deployment is good or bad. No 
true or false answer exists to determine where or when self-deployment is helpful. 
Solutions are confined to recommendations for law enforcement to train in NIMS/ICS. No 
obvious repercussions, such as discipline or funding cuts, are used to penalize self-
deployment in law enforcement. Additionally, agencies have no standardized criteria from 
which solutions can be created.  
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(4) “There is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked 
problem.”165 
The authors of the after-action reports for the Dorner manhunt and Boston 
bombings propose additional training and the development of agency policy prohibiting 
self-deployment as universal solutions. Based on the recurrence of police self-deployment 
at new events or during the same event—as seen in the Dorner manhunt—these solutions 
remain ineffective. Regardless, the only current avenue for testing these solutions is at 
another critical event where the consequences can be either bad or good. Few agencies, as 
demonstrated in both cases, utilize the applicable tenets of ICS to control self-deployment, 
even within the same event. At the same time, the structures of ICS have no room to tolerate 
trial solutions or hypotheses.  
(5) “Every solution is a one-shot operation.”166 
In both the Dorner manhunt and Boston bombings, police self-deployment visibly 
manifested with hundreds of officers clogging the roads at the cabin and the thousands of 
officers massed in Watertown. Reviewers and the media note that both situations led to 
additional problems. Nevertheless, the opportunity to evaluate a comprehensive solution 
depends on the occurrence of a duplicate event. Examining self-deployment through the 
lens of after-action reports provides a version of events in hindsight. In Boston, self-
deployment was blamed for the confusion and chaos during the firefight at Dexter and 
Laurel Streets. At the end of the firefight, a suspect was dead, one had escaped, an officer 
was hit by friendly fire, and police shot up an occupied unmarked cruiser. It remains 
unclear whether the results would have been different if the officers had not responded. 
Would there have been additional issues or more severe problems to overshadow those that 
occurred? That question is impossible to answer.  
                                                 




(6) “Wicked problems do not have an enumerable … set of potential 
solutions, nor is there a well-described set of permissible operations that 
may be incorporated into the plan.”167 
Proposed solutions to police self-deployment are limited to those that fall within 
ICS and accepted norms for policing. Both are subject to public approval. ICS significantly 
decreases issues with self-deployment in firefighting, so the expectation is high for success 
with law enforcement. Nevertheless, law enforcement continues to self-deploy at critical 
incidents. The Dorner manhunt offers an example of commanders from three agencies who 
prohibited self-deployment at the cabin scene. Notably, commanders enforced these 
prohibitions as a result of lessons learned during the event, not as a result of ICS training. 
(7) “Every wicked problem is essentially unique.”168 
Each incidence of self-deployment is viewed as a completely new phenomenon. 
Law enforcement officers are typically the initial first responders to an event. Their role, 
unlike that of other first responders, changes as the event progresses. Police officers must 
react to disparate issues simultaneously. Examples from the Dorner manhunt include the 
two assaults in Corona and Riverside. After the shots were fired, officers prioritized and 
treated minor, traumatic, and mortal injuries suffered by their fellow officers; identified 
and pursued Christopher Dorner; secured an active crime scene; and interviewed witnesses 
within a short period of time. All these responsibilities fall within law enforcement 
jurisdiction but still require a careful, methodical response. Police are experts in 
prioritization; nonetheless the emergent nature of those events required almost constant 
adjustment. As discussed in previous chapters, ICS offers little training or guidance in those 
initial minutes of an event. 
                                                 




(8) “Every wicked problem can be considered a symptom of another 
problem.”169 
Police self-deployment sometimes masks other problems or exists as a symptom of 
a different problem. In Boston, during the firefight at Dexter and Laurel Streets, did police 
self-deployment cause poor weapons discipline, blocked egress, or problems with 
command and control? Did the sheer number of officers on scene contribute to the chaos 
or help with the search? The answers to these questions, as addressed in after-action 
reports, lie in the success or failure (the good or bad results) of the mission rather than the 
actual issue of self-deployment.  
(9) “The existence of a discrepancy representing a wicked problem can be 
explained in numerous ways.”170 
Because police self-deployment has no clear definition and can be described as 
either good or bad, discrepancies are always present. For example, at the Boston Marathon 
finish line, officers were lauded for using cruisers to transport the injured when the medical 
system was overwhelmed. Nonetheless, their actions were still in violation of department 
procedure. During the Dorner manhunt, a police helicopter entered the crime scene area, 
creating a dangerous cross-fire situation; regardless, they were allowed to stay. Self-
deployment has no defining principles that completely disparage or exonerate the actions 
of self-deploying officers. In Boston, the officers responding to the shoot-out at Dexter and 
Laurel Streets became active members of “hasty search” teams. But did this same mass 
response also allow the suspect to successfully flee the scene? These and other 
contradictions lead to more discrepancies, creating false solutions—those that can be 
adjusted to reflect the views of the problem solver. 
(10) “The planner has no right to be wrong.”171 
Agency chiefs and emergency managers try to foresee as many disasters, failures, 
and catastrophes as possible when developing critical event plans. When these plans fail or 
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something happens that is not forecasted, the planner is held responsible for the 
consequences. Massachusetts State Police Colonel Timothy Alben (retired) describes this 
pressure as it relates to his experience with the Boston Marathon bombings: “In this world, 
you never eliminate risk, you never bring it down to zero ... but we are working very hard 
at reducing that risk level and managing it to the best of our collective abilities.”172 His 
statement is an honest appreciation of the challenges planners face—challenges that are 
not fully respected by ICS, which demands a clear, almost instant comprehensive appraisal 
of the problem.  
The Boston Marathon is an event that occurs annually along the same route, and 
which involves extensive and detailed planning. The planning process incorporates 
preparation for terrorist events under NIMS guidelines and ICS structures. Unlike the 
Boston Marathon, the Dorner manhunt was a no-notice event, governed by the actions of 
a man on a rampage. Nonetheless, once the bombs exploded in Boston, agencies plunged 
into a situation similar to the Dorner manhunt, with a timeline dictated by the actions of 
the Tsarnaev brothers. For a plan to truly succeed, some part of the response must remain 
unstructured to allow for the unexpected. Unlike scientific processes, however, wicked 
problems have no room for error and no rules to follow. This wicked problem characteristic 
clearly applies to police self-deployment. With so much at stake, planners behind events 
such as the Boston Marathon and the Dorner manhunt have no place to practice or make 
mistakes without the risk of high-stakes failure. ICS requires completion of a plan even 
before it is enacted or applied to the event and offers little elasticity when events change 
course rapidly, unless the changes can be forecast. Drills and tabletop exercises do not 
incorporate wicked scenarios—there is always a “right” response. 
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B. WEXLER’S MORAL CHARACTERISTICS IN CASE STUDIES 
(1) Responsibility Nexus 
Wexler’s responsibility nexus “stems from the absence of clear norms and 
precedence. Wicked problem contexts license innovation or, at least, the claimant’s belief 
that their views are purportedly new and original.”173 This nexus is at the heart of the issue 
of police self-deployment. Front-line officers are innovative, trained, and encouraged to 
self-initiate vehicle stops or investigate crime. This naturally flows into response to critical 
incidents. The problem with innovation, as presented by Wexler, is the “claimant’s belief 
that his views are new and original.”174 An example in the Dorner manhunt would be the 
officers that self-deployed, conducting independent searches without direction from the 
command post or their own agency command. They self-deployed because they believed 
their participation would make a difference. Similarly, in Boston, during the firefight at 
Dexter and Laurel Streets, officers responded because they felt they could positively 
intervene. Defining when those ideas are wrong becomes the challenge. 
(2) Risk of False Assurance 
“The more wicked the problem, the harder it is for well-intended problem solvers 
to educate about risk. They may promise more than they can deliver.”175 In hindsight, it 
always appears that adherence to the orderly structures of ICS might have solved police 
self-deployment at both events. However, evidence of repeated incidents of self-
deployment within the same event clearly illustrates that adherence to ICS does not work. 
The promise that ICS can solve all command and control problems for all first response 
agencies is simply untrue when dealing with self-deployment.  
                                                 





(3) Politics of Urgency 
“Those who claim to be acting in wicked problem contexts are rewarded for 
building up the promissory nature of their ideas and downplaying the risks.”176 Events 
driven by human behavior are wicked problems. Capturing Dorner and the Tsarnaev 
brothers ended the violence in both events, but no after-action reports identified a causal 
problem or concluded that a problem was solved. The Boston bombings were labeled a 
terrorist event. Terrorism is a wicked problem. The Dorner manhunt resisted all attempts 
at definition and remains classified as a manhunt for a murderer. Urgent events in both 
cases drove the street-level or tactical response, aligned with ongoing and complex 
investigations. Capturing Dorner and the Tsarnaevs before they could attack more people 
was the urgency driving the solutions in both cases. The solutions changed, however, as 
the cases progressed. ICS promises to restore order in chaotic situations. Wexler sees this 
as a sort of siren song; “doing something now, is far better than merely continuing as if 
there were no emergency or crisis.”177 When problem solvers fail to acknowledge that the 
problem is wicked and thus unsolvable, the risk is lessened and the problem (in this case 
the Dorner manhunt and the pursuit of the Tsarnaevs) appears solved. 
(4) Confusion over Wicked Problem Solutions 
“A portion of wicked problems are unsolvable, but the tame-wicked problem is 
unclear on how to distinguish these from other wicked problems that, with great effort, are 
solvable.”178 Wexler argues that the selling or promotion of one particular method or 
solution to a wicked problem is morally problematic. The marketing of ICS as a one-size-
fits-all response tool falls into this category, especially when dealing with terrorist or 
criminal events. NIMS and ICS require first-responding officers to identify the causal 
problem and the resources needed to solve it. These protocols are ideal for fires and 
disasters; however, when a problem, such as terrorism or a manhunt, resists definition, 
ICS’s linear response structures are less effective. When the authoritarian structures at the 
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tactical level prove problematic or ineffective, there is little for responders to resort to. 
Police self-deployment, when positive, fills this gap. 
Viewing police self-deployment through the lens of a wicked problem clarifies the 
reasons why it is so resistant to solutions. Police self-deployment matches every 
characteristic of a wicked problem, illustrating how difficult it is to recognize and how it 
can be both good and bad, even in the same event. Acknowledging police self-deployment 
as a wicked problem actually reveals options for proactively diminishing its negative 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
My interest in police self-deployment was first piqued after reading negative after-
action reports of the Dexter and Laurel Streets firefight in Boston. The reports suggested 
that police self-deployment was a causal factor in the traffic congestion that aided Dzhokar 
Tsarnaev’s flight and the accidental police shootings of Officer Donahue and an unmarked 
cruiser. I viewed the response differently; area officers responded to a call for help, which 
was dispatched over a regional radio channel, to assist fellow officers who were under fire 
from weapons and IEDs. The agencies that initially responded to the call for help had 
jurisdictional authority to be present. From my viewpoint as a police officer, the initial 
mass response to the firefight was both appropriate and necessary. Conversely, when the 
after-action reports cited police self-deployment as an underlying factor in command and 
control problems at the Arsenal Mall the following day, I found myself in agreement with 
the argument that police self-deployment was problematic.  
This thesis concludes that police self-deployment has no clear definition. 
Definitions based on behavioral explanations at the events are vague and dependent on 
good or bad results—all characteristics of wicked problems. Thus, my search for a 
comprehensive definition of police self-deployment morphed into two questions: How can 
police self-deployment be better defined and understood through the lens of wicked 
problems, and how can the resulting wicked problem definition be used to exploit good 
police self-deployment, reduce instances of bad police self-deployment, and enhance law 
enforcement response to critical incidents? The conclusions and recommendations in this 
chapter suggest that the law enforcement profession should accept self-deployment as a 
wicked characteristic of policing. To do so, ICS must acknowledge, and prepare first 
responders for, the time period known as the “edge of chaos” to limit bad self-deployment 
and encourage the ingenuity that comes from good self-deployment. 
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A. CONCLUSION #1: SELF-DEPLOYMENT IS A WICKED 
CHARACTERISTIC OF POLICING 
No distinct definition of police self-deployment emerges from either the literature 
review or the case studies. Moreover, the case studies also reveal confusion between the 
terms self-initiation and self-deployment. Further, self-deployment aligns with every 
characteristic of a wicked problem. If law enforcement accepts self-deployment as a 
wicked characteristic of the profession, opportunities to tame the bad aspects and exploit 
the good aspects become accessible.  
Self-deployment and self-initiated policing are one part of the complex 
interdependency between law enforcement and the public. This interdependency is 
expressed through historical cycles of police actions and theories with increased public 
oversight at one end and expanded self-initiated police roles at the other. Events resulting 
in more public oversight of the police include the 1968 Democratic National Convention 
and, more recently, the 2014 Ferguson, Missouri riots. The actions of officers at both events 
launched increased public and government oversight and scrutiny. Conversely, community 
and problem-oriented policing theories promote a flattened hierarchy, encouraging officers 
to solve problems at the street level with less command oversight. Recently sanctioned 
active shooter protocols rely on the decisions of first-responding line officers with less 
permission from command. 
Officers work in the realm of wicked problems—including poverty, mental illness, 
and terrorism—where situations produce more questions than answers and solutions 
address symptoms of a problem rather than solve the root issue. Unknowingly, most 
officers already tame, rather than solve, problems in their daily work. Consequently, no 
silver bullet—individual policy, single training method, or ICS structure—can control bad 
self-deployment and exploit good self-deployment. These are features central to the very 
heart of this wicked characteristic; as Keith Grint explains, 
To adopt the rather more prosaic language of Kant, we need to begin by 
recognizing “out of the crooked timber of humanity, no straight thing was 
ever made.” Put another way, to get some purchase on wicked problems we 
need to start by accepting that imperfection and making do with what is 
available is not just the best way forward but the only way forward. We also 
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need to assume that no-one has the solution in isolation and that the problem 
is a system not an individual problem and not a problem caused by or solved 
by a single aspect of the system.179 
Clearly illustrated in the Dorner manhunt and in the Boston bombings, police officers 
“make do with what is available” in times of great uncertainty or chaos. Karl Weick uses 
the term bricoleur to describe this type of person: “Bricoleurs remain creative under 
pressure, precisely because they routinely act in chaotic conditions and pull order out of 
them. Thus, when situations unravel, this is simply normal, natural trouble for bricoleurs, 
and they proceed with whatever materials are at hand. Knowing these materials intimately, 
they then are able, usually in the company of other similarly skilled people, to form the 
materials or insights into novel combinations.”180 Police officers, as bricoleurs, are 
uniquely qualified to tame wicked problems and, with a little “tinkering,” can make self-
deployment work at critical incidents and in daily patrols. Self-deployment must be 
understood as a wicked characteristic of policing rather than as a problem that needs to be 
eliminated. 
B. RECOMMENDATION #1: LAW ENFORCEMENT MUST EMBRACE 
SELF-DEPLOYMENT 
Police agencies have complex hiring processes that typically include written, 
medical, psychological, and fitness testing as well as comprehensive background 
investigations designed to recruit candidates with solid qualifications. Academy training 
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stresses the importance of self-initiated activity, yet much of the training fails to encourage 
critical thinking. Daily experiences of patrol officers reinforce self-direction and individual 
responsibility in some cases but strict adherence to protocol in others. To exploit the good 
heroic aspects of self-deployment seen at the Boston Marathon finish line yet control the 
bad effects—cruisers clogging roads, masses of unprepared officers arriving in Big Bear 
Lake for Dorner, and the “sea of blue” that moved toward the boat in Watertown—law 
enforcement must embrace self-deployment.  
The bricoleur’s tool box can be evaluated and re-stocked. One missing tool is a 
“safe space” for learning where officers can test hypotheses, ask questions, and discuss 
issues without the pressure of an ongoing event or fear of reprisal. The current model is the 
“one-shot operation,” in which officers learn on the job at critical incidents and/or a 
choreographed drill. Police officers have a unique propensity for piecing together solutions 
with what is available in the moment. Keith Grint calls this innate sense apperception—
that is, “the ability to relate new experiences to previous experiences, and to recognize 
patterns in situations that facilitate understanding and resolution.”181 Apperception is what 
enables officers to survive the edge of chaos. Scenario-based training without pre-
determined solutions provides opportunities for experience, collaboration, and a safe place 
to test hypotheses. Officers need this space to explore their response with less judgment 
and more open-ended evaluation. Traditional training provides officers with little 
opportunity to creatively pool resources, openly discuss challenges or create new solutions. 
The next step in police education should include wicked problems and a “safe space” in 
the design of scenarios and drills. These two features give police more opportunities to 
prepare for the unknown.  
Closely aligned with a safe space is collective engagement, a tool that requires a 
single commander to transfer authority to group collaboration. Only collaboration at all 
levels can successfully address wicked problems.182 Collective engagement manifests 
theoretically in community and problem-orientated policing, and practically in modern 
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active shooter protocols and the NIMS concept of unified command. Those programs that 
stress individual responsibility as a crucial part of the whole response encourage good self-
deployment and limit bad self-deployment. The downside of collaboration is that it takes 
time—time that does not exist at the edge of chaos. Nonetheless, collaborators and 
bricoleurs learn best by phronesis—Aristotle’s term for practical reasoning: 
Practical reasoning is deliberative, it takes into account local circumstances, 
it weighs tradeoffs, it is riddled with uncertainties, it depends upon 
judgment, profits from wisdom, addresses particulars, it deals with 
contingencies, is iterative and shifts aims in process when necessary. 
Practical reasoning is the stuff of practical life. It is not the stuff of 
theoretical science. It is not enduring and it is not foundational. Its aim is to 
arrive at good but imperfect decisions with respect to particular 
circumstances.183 
Phronesis, when based in experience and apperception, proves highly relevant to emergent 
situations, as described by Keith Grint regarding the role of leaders:  
Phronesis allows leaders to recognize each situation as unique but 
sufficiently familiar, so that an array of techniques may be deployed. It 
requires a form of action that focuses directly on fixing the problem itself, 
not a form of re-education or reskilling. Phronesis is not a set of universal 
rules or a pocket guide to be drawn upon for solution, but something only 
achieved through experience and reflection.184  
The collaboration that occurred in Boston among local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agency leaders ensured that one voice was heard at press conferences. This 
collaboration aligns with ICS’s concept of unified command, and resulted from years of 
partnerships, meetings, and mutual assistance among those agencies. Conversely, at the 
tactical or street level, ICS and agency training leave little space to practice ingenuity and 
creative response. Agencies must train, also, at the front lines for officers to fully embrace 
the wicked characteristic of self-deployment. 
Understanding that self-deployment is part of police response also gives leadership 
more responsibility in preventing bad self-deployment. Nonetheless, prohibiting self-
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deployment is not enough to ensure the success of an operation. According to the Police 
Foundation’s report: 
Failing to give a direct order at the time of the incident implies tacit approval 
of self-deployment. … However, simply ordering officers not to respond is 
only half of the solution. Police officers are men and women of action. 
Therefore, it is equally important that direction be given about what they 
can do in support of their fellow officers. This requires leaders to work 
cooperatively with their counterparts involved in the incident to find 
meaningful and constructive ways to support the lead agency.185  
By accepting self-deployment as a wicked characteristic of policing, law 
enforcement leaders have the opportunity to encourage positive and temper negative 
aspects. To succeed, officers must have the freedom to practice ingenuity as observed at 
the Boston Marathon finish line and the cabin in Big Bear Lake. Conversely, coordinating 
the thousands of officers that descend upon an event is equally important to success. 
Training that embraces the role of an officer as a bricoleur—someone who is skilled at 
using what is available under stressful circumstances—is necessary for leveraging law 
enforcement’s role at a critical event. 
C. CONCLUSION #2: ICS IGNORES THE EDGE OF CHAOS 
ICS is most challenging to implement during the first minutes or even hours of a 
no-notice event—the same period when the police, as the first-arriving first responders, are 
most active. Leonard Howard et al. list factors present during the edge of chaos that 
contribute to the “uncertain, ambiguous, confusing, and unstructured task environment”:  
 high-consequence  
 complex 
 novel (no pre-prepared script-plans must be developed in real time as the 
event evolves) 
 volatile/rapidly evolving 
                                                 
185 Police Foundation, Police under Attack, 83. 
 
 77
 chaotic  
 noisy (due to circumstances and reactions of survivors, bystanders, citizens, 
responders and leaders)186  
David Snowden and Mary Boone, creators of the Cynefin framework, call this time 
period “chaotic.” The Cynefin framework divides operative time periods into five domains: 
simple, complicated, complex, chaotic, and disordered.187 Leaders must respond 
differently to each domain: 
Simple and complicated contexts assume an ordered universe, where 
cause-and-effect relationships are perceptible, and right answers can be 
determined based on the facts. Complex and chaotic contexts are 
unordered—there is no immediately apparent relationship between cause 
and effect, and the way forward is determined based on emerging 
patterns. The ordered world is the world of fact-based management; the 
unordered world represents pattern-based management. The very nature 
of the fifth context—disorder—makes it particularly difficult to 
recognize when one is in it. Here, multiple perspectives jostle for 
prominence, factional leaders argue with one another, and cacophony 
rules.188 
In Snowden and Boone’s chaotic period, which they also refer to as the “realm of the 
unknowables,” they describe the role of a leader as one whose job is to “staunch the 
bleeding, not to discover patterns.”189 Identifying and recognizing the chaotic period as a 
separate but important period in emergency response gives officers time to stop the event 
before searching for viable avenues of recovery. Active shooter protocol has moved toward 
this model; officers are required to continue searching for the gunman, even when injured 
people are present, so that they can stop the violence, identifying the source of the problem.  
Police self-deployment as a response to the edge of chaos can be positively 
compared to the body’s response to a paper cut. When the body sustains a paper cut, a flood 
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of platelets rush to the damaged area to form a clot, or staunch the bleeding, as the first 
cellular response. The platelets release a chemical that calls for other cells to respond. A 
massive response at the cellular level causes inflammation and swelling at the site of the 
cut, turning the skin red and hot but also alerting the body to scan for infective agents.190 
Although the cut may look bad, this response is actually a vital part of the healing process. 
The violence at the Boston Marathon bombings and the Dorner manhunt was like a cut—
a brutal, unexpected interruption in the normalcy of life. First responders reacted, knowing 
little about what was happening but with accountability to stabilize and organize the event. 
If the event proves unpredictable, as shown in the shootouts during both cases, more police 
are called in to staunch the bleeding. This chain of events eventually resolves into 
established order, when ICS can be applied. Until there is order, the structures of ICS 
provide no assistance with resolution, organization, or response. 
Understanding that it may take time for the structure of the event to emerge from 
the disorder, and giving responders at the frontlines permission to react, may actually create 
a more effective response. Nancy Roberts calls it “groping along”:  
It is better to just get on with it rather than wait until everything is in place, 
an unlikely occurrence anyway given the circumstances. What really 
matters is each person’s willingness to make a “leap of faith” that commits 
him or her to working tougher, acting with integrity and trusting that 
somehow something will come out of the collective effort without any 
guarantees that it will. What all this amounts to is less heroics, more 
humility and a greater appreciation for experimentation, “groping along” 
and “muddling through” than we normally permit ourselves given the 
weight of our rational analytical tool kit and strategic management 
practice.191 
When ICS fails to recognize the edge of chaos, a group of potentially valuable 
responders are also excluded from the event. A phenomenon in disaster response known as 
volunteer convergence—when concerned yet unrequested citizens descend upon a scene—
is comparable to police self-deployment.192 Research shows that ICS fails both to address 
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volunteer convergence and to provide for the incorporation of aid from spontaneous 
groups, which can often achieve results faster and more efficiently in the edge of chaos in 
disasters.193 While ICS sets up elaborate systems to stage, process, and credential 
“authorized” responders, these systems become overwhelmed and are ignored, as 
illustrated in Boston and the Dorner manhunt.  
As documented by practitioners, policy makers, and the case studies in this thesis, 
ICS is less comprehensive and more problematic within the law enforcement domain.194 
Buck, Trainor, and Aguirre, authors of “A Critical Evaluation of the Incident Command 
System and NIMS,” suggest that unlike other first responders, police officers rarely use 
ICS.195 During the Boston Marathon bombings, police leadership from several agencies 
successfully integrated a unified command. At the street level in Boston and during the 
Dorner manhunt, however, the response was less coordinated. One reason was the failure 
of ICS to recognize the edge of chaos. 
D. RECOMMENDATION #2: NIMS AND ICS MUST INCORPORATE THE 
EDGE OF CHAOS  
NIMS and ICS must recognize and incorporate the initial chaotic phase of an 
incident into the response structure for two reasons. First, because chaos is normal. 
According to Cynthia Renaud, 
Making such patterns part of an everyday life will prepare first responders 
at least to expect chaos and complexity as normal. Too often, first 
responders seem to feel that initial chaos is a sign of their inability to handle 
a situation. On the contrary, they must see that chaos is what they are to 
conquer or transform–that chaos is their necessary challenge.196 
Second, because the edge of chaos offers opportunities for creative and adaptive solutions 
that vanish once the event settles into the ICS structure. In the Cynefin framework, 
Snowden and Boone describe the chaotic domain as the best place for leaders to impel 
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innovation; in this domain, people are more open to novelty and directive leadership than 
they would be in other contexts.197  
This failure to recognize the chaotic first minutes—or even hours—of a critical 
event has long been a criticism of ICS. It is time to at least recognize the edge of chaos, so 
law enforcement can move to harness first responders’ energy and innovation and protect 
those who work during this crucial period. 
E. CONCLUSION #3: LESSONS LEARNED ARE NOT SHARED, SO 
LEARNING IS LIMITED 
Police officers in the United States have at least a basic level of ICS training thanks 
to the DHS mandate and federal grant incentives. Technological innovations and changes 
in communications and response protocol have improved reaction time and first responder 
safety. ICS prohibits self-deployment, yet incidents continue to occur. One reason may be 
a lack of universal standards for after-action reporting. Research conducted by Amy 
Donahue and Robert Tuohy determined that there exists “no independent validation 
mechanism to establish whether findings and lessons are right.”198 As demonstrated in the 
Oklahoma City bombing, even reports of the same incident have different conclusions 
about similar behavior. Agency perspectives, local viewpoints, or fear of political 
retribution and legal recourse hamper absolute veracity in after-action reporting.199  
Even when published, after-action reports have no standardized dissemination. 
Although many are publicly available through online searches, no universal mechanism 
ensures distribution within the emergency response discipline, the state, the region, or the 
nation. Responders must search for reports to obtain them, which also requires them to 
have knowledge of the event.200 While some disasters and events have only regional 
applicability, events like an active shooter response have nationwide implications for first 
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responders. The Boston Marathon bombings were recognized internationally as a terrorist 
event. Conversely, the Dorner manhunt gained only regional attention. Nonetheless, both 
events exhibited similar issues with police self-deployment and opportunities for lessons 
learned. 
When agencies create after-action reports, recommendations may be minimized or 
even ignored. The episodic black swan nature of critical events and the substantial effort 
needed to radically alter training programs or agency policy, combined with changing 
politics, can produce an environment unconducive to change. The argument that police 
self-deployment is a byproduct of the event rather than a systemic issue also contributes to 
failures to fully absorb lessons learned. Donahue and Tuohy argue that the lack of a 
formalized process also hinders future improvements:  
There is a lack of systems to identify and disseminate lessons. Even when 
lessons are identified, most learning and change processes lack a formal, 
rigorous, systematic methodology. Simplistically, the lesson learning and 
change process iterates through the following steps: Identify the lesson-
recognize the causal process-devise a new operational process-practice the 
new process-embed/institutionalize and sustain the new process.201  
While the rigorous planning and training programs instituted by NIMS and ICS have 
greatly improved critical incident response since 9/11, the follow-up to these incidents 
seems less coordinated. One suggestion at the federal level is standardize after-action 
reports and establish a clearinghouse for review. 
F. RECOMMENDATION #3: DHS SHOULD ESTABLISH A 
STANDARDIZED AFTER-ACTION REPORT FORMAT AND A 
NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE  
There are currently no universal standards for creating after-action reports. While 
various organizations, such as the Police Foundation and Tri-Data Systems publish 
comprehensive professional reviews, there are no requirements that police agencies follow 
a specific format. The consequences include incomplete information, biased or skewed 
viewpoints, and unfamiliar definitions or descriptive language. While the Homeland 
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Security Exercise and Evaluation Program provides formal templates for exercise and drill 
reviews, they fail to translate well to an actual event. Moreover, with no clearinghouse to 
submit after-action reports to, emerging trends, lessons learned, incident types, success 
stories, police self-deployment patterns, and other relevant information cannot be tracked 
at the national or regional level. Without a comprehensive reporting process, 
clearinghouse, or database, no method exists for dissemination of after-action reports. 
Information cannot be amalgamated for research or improvement, and law enforcement 
professionals may miss sharable solutions.  
One possible model is the Federal Aviation Administration’s Aviation Safety 
Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system. On a website available to the public, 
ASIAS enables users to “perform integrated queries across multiple databases, search an 
extensive warehouse of safety data, and display pertinent elements in an array of useful 
formats.”202 While there are security issues with many critical events, the publicly 
available information found in the online after-action reports of the Dorner manhunt and 
Boston Marathon bombings is invaluable in a shared environment. Collaboration is at the 
heart of unified command and is the best method for taming wicked problems. A nationally 
managed sharing system with universal criteria only enhances critical incident response.  
G. FINAL THOUGHTS 
Police self-deployment is a wicked characteristic of law enforcement. When 
officers self-deploy, their actions and ingenuity can save lives, create solutions, and reduce 
damage and injury. Nonetheless, uncontrolled self-deployment can produce significant 
traffic problems, create officer safety issues, and damage inter-agency relationships. 
Prevention of self-deployment is currently limited to its outright prohibition and 
recommendations for closer adherence to ICS protocol. ICS training, however, does not 
recognize the edge of chaos and has no curriculum based on lessons learned. ICS, as 
currently structured, has earned success in law enforcement only at the unified command 
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level. Problems with adherence to ICS are common at the street or tactical level, even 
within the same event, as evidenced by the case studies in this thesis.  
Change to ICS must first start within law enforcement. Agencies and departments 
must accept self-deployment as a wicked characteristic and train to tame rather than solve 
problems. Acceptance of self-deployment should also include admitting that the edge of 
chaos is a normal and necessary part of response to an event—especially those that involve 
violent criminal behavior—and primary jurisdiction of police response. Then, law 
enforcement can work to incorporate the edge of chaos into ICS structure and training. 
Incorporating the edge of chaos into training and ICS structure and accepting self-
deployment as a wicked characteristic will lead to a reduction in bad self-deployment, the 
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APPENDIX.  ANALYTICAL TOOL 
Rittel and Webber’s Ten Characteristics of Wicked Problems203 
 Wicked Problem Characteristic Description 
1. “There is no definitive formulation 
of a wicked problem.” 
“The formulation is the problem. The process of 
formulating the problem and of conceiving a 
solution (or re-solution) is identical, since every 
specification of the problem is a specification of the 
direction in which a treatment is considered.” 
2. “Wicked problems have no 
stopping rule.” 
“There are no criteria that tell when a solution has 
been found. The process of solving the problem is 
identical with the process of understanding its 
nature. The planner terminates work on a wicked 
problem not for reasons inherent in the logic of the 
problem.”  
3. “Solutions to wicked problems are 
not true or false, but bad or good.” 
“There are no ‘conventionalized criteria’—many 
parties are equally equipped, interested and/or 
entitled to judge the solutions, although none has the 
power to set formal decision rules to determine 
correctness.” 
4. “There is no immediate and no 
ultimate test of a solution to a 
wicked problem.” 
“Any solution, after being implemented, will 
generate waves of consequences over an extended-
virtually an unbounded-period of time.” 
5. “Every solution to a wicked 
problem is a one-shot operation.” 
“Whenever actions are effectively irreversible and 
whenever the half-lives of the consequences are 
long, every trial counts. And every attempt to 
reverse a decision or to correct for the undesired 
consequences poses another set of wicked problems, 
which are in turn subject to the same dilemmas.” 
6. “Wicked problems do not have an 
enumerable (or an exhaustively 
describable) set of potential 
solutions, nor is there a well-
described set of permissible 
operations that may be 
incorporated into the plan.” 
“There are no criteria which enable one to prove that 
all solutions to a wicked problem have been 
identified and considered.” 
7. “Every wicked problem is 
essentially unique.” 
“Despite long lists of similarities between a current 
problem and a previous one, there always might be 
an additional distinguishing property that is of 
overriding importance.” 
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 Wicked Problem Characteristic Description 
8. “Every wicked problem can be 
considered a symptom of another 
problem.” 
“The process of resolving the problem starts with 
the search for causal explanation of the discrepancy. 
Removal of that cause poses another problem of 
which the original problem is a ‘symptom.’ In turn, 
it can be considered the symptom of still another 
‘higher level’ problem.” 
9.  “The existence of a discrepancy 
representing a wicked problem can 
be explained in numerous ways. 
The choice of explanation 
determines the nature of the 
problem’s resolution.” 
“There is no rule or procedure to determine the 
‘correct’ explanation or combination of them. The 
reason is that in dealing with wicked problems there 
are several more ways of refuting a hypothesis than 
there are permissible in the sciences.” 
10.  “The planner has no right to be 
wrong.” 
“Planners dealing with wicked problems are liable 
for the consequences of the actions they generate; 
the effects can matter a great deal to those people 
that are touched by those actions.” 
 
WEXLER’S MORAL CHARACTERISTICS204 
 
The Responsibility Nexus  
“Wicked problem contexts license innovation or, at least, the claimants’ (knowledge sellers’) 
belief that their views are purportedly new and original.” 
 
The Risk of False Assurance 
“The more wicked the problem, the harder it is for well-intended problem solvers to educate 
about risk. In their determination to push the knowledge frontier and distinguish themselves by 
their claims, they may promise more than they can deliver.” 
 
The Politics of Urgency 
“Political refers to the manner in which the attention-getting use of “urgency” can be used to 
rally others about a cause of which one claims to have the best answer. The call to urgency 
justifies lower scrutiny and monitoring of the solution.” 
 
Confusion over Wicked Problem Solutions 
“A portion of wicked problems are, unsolvable, but the tame-wicked problem is unclear on how 
to distinguish these from other wicked problems that, with great effort, are solvable.” 
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